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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Demand systems obtained from the utility maximization process are a 
tractable representation of preferences. The variables in these demand 
systems (prices, quantities and income) can be observed and the estimation 
of these demand systems yield empirical measures of elasticities that throw 
light on consumer behavior and have obvious implications for policy 
formation. It is therefore not surprising that the area of applied demand 
analysis has forged an active interaction of consumer theory and 
econometrics. 
Empirical demand studies often examine demand systems that are 
specified and estimated in apparent isolation of the supply side. To 
obtain consistent estimates of the underlying preferences, one of two 
assumptions are made. Either prices are assumed predetermined or 
quantities are assumed to be predetermined. The first of these assumptions 
leads to quantity dependent demand systems which is the usual 
representation of preferences for the individual consumer. At the 
aggregate level they would imply that prices are given in the market as in 
the case of a small trading economy or when prices are fixed as in the case 
of some public utilities. 
The second assumption leads to price dependent demands which imply 
that supplies are fixed at the market level and prices must adjust for 
markets to clear. Such 'inverse' demand functions are useful, for example, 
when analyzing the demands for perishable products over a short period of 
time. Demand systems, whether direct or inverse, are estimated using 
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Flexible Functional Forms (FFFs), a concept that is now widely used in 
applied econometrics. 
In section I of this dissertation, a new flexible linear inverse 
demand system is proposed. Unlike other flexible inverse demands that are 
nonlinear, the new demand system is easy to estimate, an advantage that 
might be significant for large demand systems. The performance of this 
demand system is examined in a simulation exercise. The existence of such 
market demands, however implies that preferences belong to a certain class 
that satisfies conditions necessary for aggregating over consumers. A 
flexible inverse demand system that satisfies aggregation conditions is 
also proposed in this section. 
In addition to the two polar cases of direct and inverse demand 
systems, demand systems can reflect yet another market situation where 
optimal quantity decisions are made for some (say, group A) commodities, 
given their prices, while prices adjust to clear the market for the other 
(group B) commodities, given their supplies. The Canadian market for meats 
is a clear example of the above market situation since Canada trades freely 
in beef and pork with the U.S., while the market for chicken is subject to 
supply management. Under the small country assumption, prices of beef and 
pork are thus given while for chicken it is the supply that is given. 
However, the existing theoretical framework that examines mixed 
demands does not help in specifying an empirical model that is amenable to 
estimation. In this study, the concept of virtual or shadow prices is used 
in deriving a dual representation of preferences for the mixed demand case. 
The equivalent of the Slutsky relations are derived, which are used in the 
specification of a differential approximation of mixed demands. The 
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proposed model is then used to analyze the Canadian situation. 
Separability of preference structure is a frequently Invoked 
assumption (as in the case of mixed demands for meat) in a lot of empirical 
work. It is, however, a strong assumption and ideally should be tested 
before it is maintained. Testing separability using flexible functional 
forms is, however, problematic. This is because imposing separability 
globally on most FFFs renders them inflexible. As an alternative, 
separability has been tested locally at a point, recognizing that a FFF, 
after all, provides only a local approximation at a point, to some unknown 
function. 
In Section III, the ability of a recently proposed globally separable 
functional form is compared in a Monte Carlo study to locally imposed 
separability. Since the globally separable model is not nested in the 
general non-separable model, non-nested hypothesis tests are used to test 
for separability in this case. The study reveals the performance of the 
new functional form and the performance of the non—nested tests used. 
Explanation of dissertation format 
This dissertation consists of three complete, self—contained essays. 
Each essay contains its own introduction, sections on theory and 
applications, results and references. The axioms of consumer preference, 
and estimation of systems of equations are discussed in Section I although 
they apply to all the sections of the dissertation. The concept of 
flexibility of functional forms is also introduced in Section I. 
4 
SECTION I. FLEXIBLE INVERSE DEMAND SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
Studies in applied demand analysis commonly deal with quantity 
dependent demands where prices are assumed to be exogenous. This is 
usually the case for a single consumer who makes optimal quantity decisions 
given prices and income. At the market level, however, quantity dependent 
or 'direct' demands are valid for a small trading economy that faces world 
prices or in the case of public utilities where prices are fixed. 
Price dependent or 'inverse' demands may be more appropriate for 
certain other market situations where the quantities (supplies) are given 
at any point in time and prices must adjust to clear the markets. 
Arguably, most agricultural commodities at the market level provide a good 
illustration of this situation. Also, from the perspective of the planner 
(or price forecaster) the relevant demand concept is the inverse demand 
system explaining prices in terms of (expected) output. Often, therefore, 
it may be natural to think of price as a function of quantities. From a 
theoretical point of view there is no problem with this, as the demand 
relation can be expressed in either the direct or indirect sense. As 
Hurwicz (1971) points out, there is no contradiction between the view of 
the consumer as the price taker and the use of price as the dependent 
variable. 
However, for market demands to exist preferences must satisfy certain 
aggregation conditions. Aggregating demands over individuals is legitimate 
when Engel curves are linear (i.e., preferences are homothetic or quasi-
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homothetic), in which case the cost or indirect utility functions are of 
the Gorman Polar Form (GPF), or if the Engel curves are generalized linear, 
in which case the cost or indirect utility functions are of the Generalized 
Gorman Polar Form (GGPF) (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a). 
A concept that has gained wide acceptance in empirical economics is 
that of a Flexible Functional Form. Typically, flexible inverse demands 
are derived by applying Wold's identity to a flexible specification of the 
direct utility function. In general, these inverse demands do not satisfy 
aggregation conditions, and are non-linear in form which may pose a problem 
for demand systems involving large number of commodities. For example, in 
the case of the Translog specification (Christensen and Manser 1977), 
inverse demands satisfy aggregation conditions and have an easily estimable 
linear form when homotheticity is imposed. However, homotheticity is a 
strong and implausible assumption in most cases. Barnett (1977) estimates 
an inverse demand system that satisfies linear aggregation conditions but a 
very restrictive utility function is used.l More recently, Salvas-
Bronsard, Leblanc and Bronsard (1977), Huang (1988) and Barten and 
Bettendorf (1989) estimated Rotterdam type differential inverse demand 
systems, that satisfy an alternate but meaningful criteria of flexibility. 
In this section, two flexible inverse demand systems are proposed. An 
inverse demand system that satisfies the flexibility criteria and offers 
the advantage of being linear is proposed. This demand system is derived 
from the symmetric dual of the cost function underlying the Almost Ideal 
B^arnett estimates the inverse demands derived from a separable 
utility function (the W-S branch discussed in section III) that is not 
flexible for the 3-{:roup (with 10 goods) case that he considers. 
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Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b), but does not itself claim 
any aggregation properties. A simulation exercise studies its performance 
in relation to the older Translog inverse demand system. A second flexible 
inverse demand system that satisfies aggregation is also proposed. This 
demand system belongs to the class of quasi-homothetic preferences which is 
less restrictive than the class of homothetic preferences. 
This section of the dissertation is organized as follows. First, the 
theory of inverse demands is discussed. This includes the regularity 
conditions, the derivation of the inverse demand functions and the 
restrictions on the inverse system. For the sake of clarity in what is to 
follow, the concept of flexible functional forms is introduced and the 
aggregation problem is discussed. This is followed by a brief discussion 
of the estimation of demand systems. The linear inverse demand system is 
then presented along with the simulation results after which the aggregable 
flexible model is specified. Summary and conclusions are presented in the 
final sub-section. 
Theory of Inverse Demands 
Inverse demands can be derived directly from the direct utility 
function or from its implied representation, the distance or transformation 
function. In either case it is the duality between the direct and the 
indirect representation of preferences that is exploited. 
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Regularity conditions 
The following axioms of choice guarantee the existence of a quasi-
concave utility function. The symbol k is used to mean "at least as good 
as". Subscripts indicate different bundles of commodities. 
Axiom 1: Reflexivlty. For any bundle x, x k x. 
Axiom 2: Completeness. For any two bundles in the choice set x^  and xg, 
either x^  k Xg or xg k x^  ; if both x^  k Xg and xg k x^  then Xy^  = 
Xg i.e., x^  is indifferent to xg. 
Axiom 3: Transitivity. If x^  k Xg and Xg k Xq then x^  k Xg. 
Axiom 4: Continuity. For any bundle Xy^  define a(xy^ ) the "at least as good 
as Xy^  set" and b(xy^ ) the "no better than Xy^  set" by 
a(xA) - { X I X k Xy^  ) 
b(xy^ ) - { X I Xy^  k X ) 
Then a(xy^ ) and b(xy^ ) are closed. 
Axiom 5: Non-satiation. The utility function U(x) is non-decreasing in 
each of its arguments for all x in the choice set and is increasing in 
at least one of its arguments. 
Axiom 6: Convexity. If x^  ^k Xg, then for 1, Axy^ +(1-A)xg ^  xg. 
Axioms 1—3 define a preference ordering but axioms 4 and 5 are needed 
for the existence of a utility function that represents the preference 
ordering. Axiom 6 implies a quasi-concave utility function (the utility 
function Is strictly quasi-concave for strictly convex preferences; in 
terms of Axiom 6, the last weak inequality is changed to a strict 
inequality). 
In this analysis, attention is restricted to cases where the demand 
functions (direct, Inverse or mixed) are unique solutions to their 
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respective optimization processes. Strong quasl-concavlty Is assumed, and 
In addition, It Is assumed that the utility function (and all Its dual 
representations) are twice continuously dlfferentlable In their respective 
arguments.^  
Derivation of Inverse demand functions 
The Lagranglan for the primal problem of utility maximization subject 
to the budget constraint is 
Max £ - U(x) - A [p«x - y] (1) 
X 
The first order conditions are 
Ui(x) - Api 1-1,2,...n (2) 
and p*x - y (3) 
where U^ fx) is the partial differential of U with respect to x^ . Solving 
for X£ we get the direct Marshallian demands, 
Xi - Xi(P.y) or xj^  - X£(jr) (4) 
where - p^ /y is the normalized price of x^ . 
Substituting for the optimal quantities in the direct utility function, we 
obtain the indirect utility function, 
I^n the absence of differentiability, monotonicity of the primal and 
dual representations is necessary for most duality results. Alternatively, 
one can restrict the domain to the interior, assume local non-satiation or 
assume indifference curves do not intersect the axis (Blackorby, Prlmont 
and Russel 1977). 
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V(x(*)) - V(*) (5) 
where V(.) is continuous, decreasing and quasi-convex in tt. The 
expenditure or cost function C(u,p) can be obtained by inverting the 
indirect utility function. Multiplying both sides of (2) by xj^  and summing 
over 1 and solving for X we have 
A - Zi Ui(x) xj / y (6) 
Substituting for A in (2) and solving for we have, 
Ti - Ui(x) / Si Ui(x) Xi (7) 
for all 1-1,2 n. This is the Wold-Hotelling identity which defines 
the inverse demand system from a differentiable direct utility function. In 
general we can re-write (7) as 
n - fl(x) (8) 
The same solution can be obtained by substituting for xj^  from (4) into 
the direct utility function. Minimizing this Indirect utility function (5) 
over the normalized prices subject to the budget constraint )r«x - 1 yields 
the normalized prices as functions of quantities. 
The distance or transformation function which is an implicit and 
equivalent representation of the direct utility function is defined (Deaton 
and Muellbauer 1980a) as D(x,u) which satisfies 
U[x/D(x,u)] - u 
If U(x) - u, D(x,u) - 1. Its duality to the cost function is evident from 
10 
D(x,u) - min [ p«x: C(u,p) - 1 ] and 
P 
C(u,p) - min [p«x: D(x,u) - 1 ] 
X 
D(x,u) is increasing, linear homogeneous and concave in x and decreasing in 
u. There also exists the following derivative property which is analogous 
to Shephard's lemma :^  
- fl*(x,u) - Di(x,u) (9) 
The partial of D(.) with respect to x^  gives the level of normalized prices 
that induce the consumer to consume a bundle that lies on a ray passing 
through x, which gives utility 'u'. These (starred) inverse demands are 
thus compensated demands. If u - U(x), we have the following identity 
which gives us the Marshallian inverse demands. 
- fl*(x,U(x)) - fl(x) 
Restrictions on the inverse demand system 
Restrictions on inverse demands are analogous to those on the direct 
demands (Anderson 1980). Just as in the case of the compensated and 
uncompensated elasticities, the income elasticity also has its counterpart 
for the inverse demand system. 
The analogue to the income elasticity is the scale elasticity. The 
question raised is, if the quantity of all commodities is changed 
proportionately, how would the normalized prices change? In terms of 
Figure 1, the scale elasticity would tell us how prices would change if 
T^he distance function has been used to define quantity and utility 
indices (e.g., Beaton 1979). 
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Good 2 
Good 1 
'k-'k ' ' "b-^B • ' 
Table 1. Scale and Slutsky effects for inverse demands 
12 
quantities increased from Xg to kxg, i.e. along the ray radiating from the 
origin. 
Formally, let x° be the reference vector and let x-kx° be the vector 
of interest where k is a scaler. The inverse demand can then be expressed 
as 
jTj - f^ (kx°) • g^ (k,x°) (10) 
The scale elasticity of good i is defined as 
- go(k/S^ ) 
where is g^  the derivative of g^  with respect to k. When preferences are 
homothetic, the scale elasticities are identically equal to -1. In 
general, for normal goods, the scale elasticities can be positive or 
negative. A positive scale elasticity implies a luxury good, and a 
negative scale elasticity close to zero implies a necessity. Scale 
elasticities that are negative and large in absolute value imply inferior 
commodities.4 The proportionate change in the price of good i with 
respect to good j or 'flexibility' is defined as 
&ij - (8*i/axj)(Xj/ni) - fj(x)(xj/fi(x)) 
From the definition of g^  in (10), 
K^ohli (1985) shows that in a two good model when one of the goods is 
a Giffen good (i.e., has a negative income elasticity and a positively 
sloped direct demand), the inverse demand of the other good has a 
positively sloped inverse demand and a positive scale elasticity while the 
inverse demand of the Giffen good itself is downward sloping. The other 
good is called an 'anti-Giffen' good. This observation of course does not 
generalize for the more than two goods case. 
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Mi - Sj fj (Xj/fl) or 
/jj - Sj 5£j (11) 
This is analogous to the homogeneity restriction in the case of direct 
demands. The analogues to the Cournot and Engel aggregation conditions are 
shown below. Using the definition of the expenditure share we can 
write the budget constraint as 
fl(x) Xi - 1 
Differentiating with respect to xj, 
% ff X£ + fJ - f^ (Xj/f^ )f^  x^  + fJxj - 0 or 
Si — —Wj (12) 
which is analogous to Cournot aggregation. The Engel aggregation is 
obtained by summing (12) over j and using (11), 
Si PiWi - -1 
Just as the Slutsky equation breaks up the price effect into the 
substitution and the income effects, its analogue in the case of inverse 
demand breaks up the change in normalized prices into the substitution and 
scale effects. The second partial differentials of the distance function 
give the Ântonelli substitution effects, which state the amounts by which 
normalized prices change with respect to a marginal change of the reference 
consumption xj, keeping the consumer on the same indifference level. From 
(9) we can derive the compensated flexibilities 
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4j - ff ("j/f'*) (13) 
Since D(.) is homogeneous of degree one in x, f^ * is homogeneous of degree 
zero in x. Hence, using Euler's theorem, 
Sj Sfj - 0 (14) 
From the properties of D(.), the matrix of Antonelli effects is negative-
semi-definite. Therefore the 'own' flexibilities are always negative, i.e. 
< 0. Anderson (1980) calls this the 'law of inverse demand'. 
In Figure 1, to induce the consumer to change the consumption bundle 
from x^  to xg, the normalized prices have to change from to jrg. This 
change can be broken up into the substitution effect, where prices change 
from to xg so that the consumer is allowed to consume the bundle Xq 
which leaves her utility unchanged; and the scale effect, where the prices 
change from itq to ttq so that the consumer is able to consume more of all 
the commodities (xg), leaving their proportions unchanged. 
Thus the total change in normalized prices can be decomposed into 
substitution and scale effects. To derive formally the analogue to the 
Slutsky equation, let x° be the reference vector as before, and x the 
vector of interest such that x-kx°. The utility function is U(kx°) and as 
in (10), the normalized prices are given by wj^ -g^ (k,x°). The question now 
is: how do the normalized prices change for a marginal change in the 
reference vector, say, a change in xj? Totally differentiating (10) we 
have, 
djr£ - gj dxj* + g^  dk (15) 
15 
Since utility is held constant along the same indifference curve for a 
change in any xj*, 
dU - 0 - Uj^ xf dk + kUj dxj* or 
dk - -(Uj / S U^ Xi) k2 dxj) - -irj k^  dxj» (16) 
Finally, letting k-1 and substituting (16) for dk in (15), 
g| - (aw£/axj)u + go*j 
In elasticity terms, 
i^j ~ ^ ij ~ /^ i^ j (17) 
where the starred fi's are 'compensated' flexibilities. 
The Antonelli matrix of substitution effects (A) and the Slutsky 
matrix (S) are generalized inverses of each other (Deaton and Muellbauer 
1980a)^  so that 
S - y(SAS) 
and 
A - y(ASA) 
W^hen one of the prices is treated as the numeraire, the Antonelli and 
Slutsky matrices are (n-l)x(n-l) in size and S-A~^  (Katzner 1970 p.49). In 
terms of elasticities, the full matrix of flexibilities is the inverse of 
the matrix of elasticities (Houck 1966). 
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Flexible Functional Forms 
Traditionally, mathematically convenient forms like the Cobb-Douglas, 
the CES and the Leontief were used to represent utility functions. These 
functions however imposed severe restrictions on the nature of preferences. 
For instance, the Cobb-Douglas utility forces all Allen elasticities to 
equal unity, the Leontief forces them to be equal to zero, and the CES 
forces them to be a constant. None of these cases is in general likely. 
Consequently, a search for more general forms with fewer restrictions on 
the parameters have yielded a number of flexible functional forms (FFF). 
A function f(x) represents a second order differential approximation 
to a function g(x) at the point x° iff 
f(x°) - g(x°) 
Vf(xO) - Vg(xO) 
v2f(x°) - v2g(xO) 
Thus the parameters of f(x) can be chosen such that its function value, 
gradient and Hessian equal the corresponding magnitudes for any arbitrary 
function g(x) at x°. If n is the dimension of the vector x, a FFF must 
have at least 1 + n + n(n+l)/2 parameters, which is the minimum amount of 
parametric freedom a functional form must have to satisfy the minimality 
property of Barnett and Lee (1985). For the case of demand systems, the 
number of free parameters needed for the flexibility criteria is fewer than 
this because of the ordinality of the utility function. For example, if a 
FFF is used to approximate the direct utility function, the function value 
itself need not be approximated, and in addition, the parametric 
17 
representation of preferences are Invariant to any monotonie transformation 
of the utility function. This permits arbitrary normalizations on the 
gradient® and on the Hessian, bringing down the number of free parameters 
needed to (n-1)(n+4)/2. 
A somewhat stronger definition of a second order approximation is that 
of a second order numerical approximation which is necessary and sufficient 
for the definition of differential approximation to hold (Barnett 1983). 
Thus a Taylor series approximation to a function f(x) can be Interpreted as 
a second order differential approximation to an arbitrary function g(x) at 
the point x°. 
The more commonly used FFFs Include the Translog (Chrlstensen, 
Jorgensen and Lau 1975), the quadratic, and the generalized Leontief all of 
which are special cases of the generalized quadratic (Blackorby, Prlmont 
and Russel 1978).^  A flexible specification of demands that is widely 
used today is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model (Deaton and 
Muellbauer 1980b) who use a Translog FFF in the specifying a cost function 
that satisfies aggregation conditions. 
Other FFFs that have been proposed Include the Mlnflex Laurent system 
of Barnett (1985), based on the Laurent series expansion that also provides 
a local approximation. This model possesses more parameters than the 
Translog or the generalized Leontief, but most of its coefficients are 
T^ypically, this normalization is Imposed to overcome the identification 
problem of the parameters, as in the case of the Translog. 
B^erdnt and Khaled (1979) introduced the Generalized Box-Cox 
functional form which contains most other commonly used FFFs like the 
Translog, quadratic functional form and the Generalized Leontief as 
limiting or special cases. 
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subject to Inequality constraints. Unlike the FFFs mentioned above, the 
Fourier flexible form of Gallant (1981), based on a nonparametrlc approach, 
can provide a global approximation. This is, however, achieved at the 
expense of considerable computational burden. 
More recently, Dlewert and Wales (1988a) proposed a demand systems 
derived from normalized quadratic Indirect utility and expenditure 
functions, on which curvature conditions can be Imposed (on a similar note, 
Lewbel (1989) also proposed a globally concave flexible expenditure 
function). However, only the model derived from the expenditure function 
retains its flexibility after the restrictions are Imposed. Even in this 
case, Imposition of curvature conditions may prove difficult for a large 
number of goods, lack of degrees of freedom, or computational difficulties. 
For such situations, Dlewert and Wales (1988b) present a procedure of 
choosing the 'degree of flexibility' consistent with feasibility of 
estimation such that concavity conditions are maintained without obviously 
restricting the second order derivatives. The resulting functional form is 
termed 'semlflexlble'. 
Another approach to local approximation is the differential approach 
or the Rotterdam model. While the FFF approach can be considered an 
approximation in the variable space, the differential approach can be 
viewed as an approximation in the parameter space.& 
Although there has been a considerable debate on the merits of various 
FFFs, the Translog has been shown to perform as well or better than most 
others by the criteria of statistical performance (Berdnt, Darrough, and 
T^he Rotterdam model is discussed In section II of the dissertation. 
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Diewert 1977) and tracking known functions in Monte Carlo studies (Wales 
1977, Guilkey, Love11 and Sickles 1983). Another consideration is the 
models' tendency to violate maintained regularity conditions within the 
region of the data. Caves and Christensen (1980) developed a procedure for 
deriving and graphically displaying the regular regions of the FFFs. They 
found that the regularity properties of the Translog and the generalized 
Leontief deteriorated rapidly as elasticities were moved away from those at 
each model's globally well behaved special cases, i.e., when preferences 
are homothetic in both the cases. In a similar analysis, Barnett and Lee 
(1985) compare the regular regions of the Translog and the generalized 
Leontief to the Minflex Laurent model. They show that the Minflex Laurent 
model violates curvature conditions less often than the other two. 
In Section I of the dissertation, the Translog functional form is used 
in specifying a FFF for a distance function from which the Linear Inverse 
Demand System is derived. The Translog is also modified to represent 
quasi-homothetic preferences from which an aggregable demand system is 
derived. 
The Aggregation Problem 
Schematically, figure (4) Shows the two alternatives of aggregating 
individual demand functions and individual preferences (Van Daal and 
Merkies 1984). Clearly, aggregating over individual preferences is of 
little practical Importance since no empirical content can be attached to 
utility either at the individual level or at the market level. Moreover, 
there is the problem of inter-personal comparison which precludes the 
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Aggregation Aggregation 
Individual 
Preferences 
Aggregate 
Preferences 
Aggregate 
Demands 
Individual 
Demands 
Table 2. Aggregation In demand analysis 
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aggregation of individual indifference curves. Therefore, in consumption 
analysis, the aggregation problem is limited to the aggregation of demand 
functions over individuals. 
The questions that remain for all practical purposes are, 
(i) Under what conditions is the average (aggregate) demand a function of 
prices and of average incomes? These conditions permit 'exact linear 
aggregation' i.e. the average demands can be expressed as x(p,y) where x 
- (1/H) Z^ x^ , y - (1/H) Z^ y^  and the superscript h refers to the h^ h 
individual (household); H is the total number of individuals.^  
(ii) What are the (less restrictive) conditions which allow us to express 
the average demand as x (p,y°), where x is the average demand as before 
and y° is the 'representative' level of income which is in general a 
function of the distribution of income and of prices? These are the 
conditions which permit 'exact non-linear aggregation'. 
As Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) point out, (i) and (ii) can hold 
whether or not utility maximization holds at the market level. In fact, 
the additional requirement of utility maximization leaves the restrictions 
on individual Engel curves required by exact (linear and nonlinear) 
aggregation unchanged (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a, p.161). 
For (i) to hold for any demand system, the Engel curves have to be 
linear and the slopes identical across individuals so that a re-allocation 
of a unit of income from one individual to another leaves the total demand 
unchanged. In other words, the marginal propensities to consume of all 
T^he additional condition 5x(p,y)/apj^  - SjjX^ (p,y)/ap£ is satisfied 
when the number of individuals is greater than the number of commodities 
(Schafer and Sonnenschein 1982). 
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individuals are Identical. This means that preferences are homothetlc 
(Elsenberg's theorem In Shafer and Sonnenschein 1982) or quasl-horaothetic 
(Muellbauer 1975, 1976). This is the class of preferences (Gorman Polar 
Form) for which exact aggregation is possible. 
For (11) to hold, the marginal propensities (the slopes of the Engel 
curves) vary linearly with one another as total expenditure changes at 
constant prices. This is the case of 'generalized linearity' where the 
representative income level is, in general, some point in the Income 
distribution, the position of which is determined by the degree of non-
linearity in the Engel curves and by the prevailing prices. A special case 
occurs when the representative expenditure level is independent of prices 
and depends only on the distribution of Income. This is the case of price 
independent generalized linearity (PIGL) the logarithmic form of which 
(PIGLOG) is specially amenable to estimation.^ ® The PIGLOG form belongs 
to the generalized GPF.^  ^
For empirical purposes, all the above restrictions on preferences, 
which make aggregation legitimate, imply restrictions on the Indirect 
®^The AIDS and a particular case of the Translog both belong to the 
PIGLOG class (Lewbel 1987a). 
^^ The entire aggregation issue can be viewed as a discussion of Engel 
curves. Gorman (1981) showed that demand functions of the form 
Xj^ -Sj.a^ f^'^ (y), where a^  and f are some functions of prices and income 
respectively and 1 refers to the i^  ^good, can have at most three terms and 
discussed the possible functions that f^  can take. Lewbel (1987b) 
characterized a subset of the above demands, where x^ -a^ +b^ y+c^ f and showed 
that homothetlc, quasi-homothetic, PIGL and PIGLOG preferences are special 
cases when a^ -0. Muellbauer's (1975) class of generalized linear demands 
is more general than this class. Approaching the description of Engel 
curves from another angle, Lewbel (1987c) provided a complete 
characterization of fractional demand systems of which homothetlc, PIGL and 
PIGLOG are particular cases. 
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utility or the cost functions, both of which can be used in deriving the 
direct demand systems to be estimated. In the case of inverse demands, the 
restrictions would apply directly to the utility or the distance function. 
This again means restrictions on the functional forms chosen to approximate 
these functions. 
In the context of aggregation, Jorgensen, Lau and Stoker (1982) 
introduce a tractable manner of modeling heterogeneous preferences by 
introducing an attribute vector at the individual level. In the same vein 
of analysis Heineke and Shefrin (1990) analyze the conditions under which 
the parameters of the estimated aggregate demand system can be used to 
identify the parameters of the underlying individual demand systems. 
Aggregation has been of interest in empirical analysis. In one such recent 
study Lee, Pesaran and Pierse (1990) test for aggregation bias in linear 
models where aggregation bias is defined in terms of the deviations of 
macro parameters from the averages of the corresponding micro parameters. 
The two classes of preferences that are consistent with exact linear 
aggregation i.e. homothetic and quasi-homothetlc preferences are briefly 
discussed below. 
Homothetic preferences 
Homothetic preferences imply linear income expansion paths that 
radiate from the origin. In general, the cost function that is dual to 
this class of preferences takes the form 
C(u,p) -f(u)b(p) (18) 
where b(p) is homogeneous of degree one and is concave and f is an 
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Increasing function of u. For Income distribution to be of no consequence, 
b(p) has to be Identical for all Individuals, while the utility levels can 
vary. The indirect utility function takes the form 
V(y,p) - y/b(p) (19) 
In deriving indirect demands, Wold's identity can be directly applied 
to the homothetic utility function. Alternatively the distance function 
can be used. If the direct utility function is homothetic, the distance 
function is homogeneous of degree zero in x and u. The distance function 
for the class of homothetic preferences is given by 
D(u,x) - b(x)/u 
where b(x) homogeneous and concave in x. 
Quasi—homothetic preferences 
In the case of quasi-homothetic preferences the Engel curves are still 
linear but do not radiate from the origin. In fact, they radiate from a 
base 'surface' which need not necessarily lie in the consumption space (the 
positive orthant). When it does, the points on this surface can be 
interpreted as 'subsistence' bundles. Evidently, these subsistence bundles 
depend on prices. If the surface degenerates to a point, the underlying 
preferences are said to be affinely homothetic, and the subsistence bundles 
are independent of prices. If the point coincides with the origin, the 
preferences are homothetic (Blackorby, Boyce and Russel 1978). The income 
elasticities for quasi-homothetic preferences tend to unity as income 
increases. 
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The less restrictive assumption of quasi-homotheticity has been 
extensively discussed in terms of the cost and indirect utility functions. 
A fixed cost element is added to the cost function (18) so that the Gorman 
Polar Form is given by 
C(u,p) - a(p) + ub(p) 
where a(p) can be interpreted as the 'subsistence' expenditure when u=0, 
and can vary across individuals. Both a(p) and b(p) are linear homogeneous 
and concave. The indirect utility function is given by 
V(p,y) - (y-a(p))/b(p) - y/b(p) - a(p)/b(p) 
which can be interpreted as the real value of expenditure in excess of that 
required for subsistence. Clearly, V(p,y) is homogeneous of degree zero in 
p and y. 
Both the above forms give legitimate forms of the cost and indirect 
utility functions that can be employed in deriving market level direct 
demand systems. To derive inverse demands, the utility or the distance 
function underlying quasi-homothetic preferences have to be known. When 
Engel curves radiate from a single point 7-(7i,72.•••7n)> preferences are 
homothetic to the point 7 i.e., U(x-7) is homogeneous in the translated 
variables x-7. When the point 7 is fixed and is in the positive orthant, 
it takes on the interpretation of a subsistence bundle.In general 
l^ Dickinson (1980) uses a flexible cost function for quasi-homothetic 
preferences where the Engel curves are parallel (and linear) and the 
substitution possibilities are independent of the utility level. He does 
this by letting C-u(Sj^ pj^ 7£)+A(p), where A(p) can be approximated by one of 
the FFFs like the Translog. 
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however 7 is a function of prices and can lie anywhere, i.e the co­
ordinates of 7 can be positive or negative. The preferences underlying the 
GPF indirect utility function are given by 
V(jr,l) - Max ( U(x-7) + U(7) | n«x-l; x-x+7; U(7)-0 ) 
X . 7  
_ A 
where U is linearly homogeneous in the translated variable (x-7) and U is 
an arbitrary function which attains a maximum at zero (Blackorby and 
Schworm 1988). x is the total consumption, 7 is the base level consumption 
quantity, and x, the consumption in excess this level. In reality, 7 
cannot be observed and is usually (in empirical studies) assumed to be 
independent of prices and treated as a parameter. This is the case in the 
Linear Expenditure System (LES) derived from the Stone-Geary utility 
function which takes the fonn of the Cobb-Douglas in the displaced 
variable. This will also be the case in the aggregable empirical model to 
be specified later. In all these cases, preferences are described only for 
all (x-7)>0.13 
Estimation of Systems of Equations 
Demand equations derived from some flexible representation of 
preferences (or which are differential approximations as in the case of the 
mixed demands in Section II) involve cross equation restrictions implied by 
theory. In addition, one can in general expect contemporaneous correlation 
l^ Income levels have to be sufficiently high if quasi-homothetic 
preferences (with fixed 7) are assumed so that (x-7) is positive. In terms 
of the cost function C(U,p)-a(p)+Ub(p), this means that C(U,p)>a(p) so that 
concavity is not violated. 
27 
across the equations. The demand equations are therefore treated as a set 
of equations and are estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
Equations (SURE) technique. To make the specified (deterministic) 
equations stochastic for the purpose of estimation, random error terms are 
appended to each of the (possibly nonlinear) demand equations.The 
stochastic system of equations is given by 
-  f ( Z f . , 0 )  + Uj. t - 1,2 T 
where Wj. is a Mxl vector of expenditure shares, Zj. is the vector of n 
independent variables (quantities in the case of inverse demands) at time t 
and ff is the vector of all coefficients to be estimated, t indexes time 
series and Uj. is a Mxl vector of random errors that satisfies : 
E(ut) - 0 (20) 
E(UtUc') - 0 (21) 
E(ucus') - 0 t T' s (22) 
conditions (21) and (22) imply contemporaneous correlation, i.e., nonzero 
covariances between the disturbances in different equations, with the same 
covariance at each sample point. They also imply that the disturbance 
variance is different for the different equations, but homoskedasticity and 
zero covariances are imposed within each equation. Since the shares add up 
to one, the parameters of the equations can be recovered from the rest of 
the equations.. This adding up condition implies that the matrix of 
l^ ocher ways of incorporating the random error have been considered. 
McElroy (1987) and Chavas and Segerson (1987) embed the error terms into 
the objective functions. The error terms entering the demand equations 
derived from such models need not necessarily be homoskedastic. 
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covariance is singular. Hence one of the equations is dropped in 
estimation. 
Assuming the vector of disturbances is multinormally distributed, 
maximum likelihood estimation can be done. The log-likelihood function of 
all T sets of observations is: 
T 
4(9,0) - -(1/2)MT ln(2*) - (1/2)T ln|0| -(1/2) Z u^ -O-^ u^  
t-1 
The concentrated likelihood function is given by 
Z { d )  - k - H T In |n*| 
where k - (-H MT ln(2jr) - h MT), a constant that can be ignored in the 
maximization process. 0* - (1/T)(UU'), where U - (u^  u?). Since the 
components of the variance-covariance matrix 0 are non-linear functions of 
the parameters 8, a numerical optimization procedure like Davidon-Fletcher-
Powell (DFP) algorithm can be used. 
The Linear Inverse Demand System 
The AIDS model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) is one of the most 
commonly used demand systems in applied demand analysis. While the 'ideal' 
connotation of this model stems from its aggregation properties, it is 
arguable that one of the main reasons for its popularity is the 
availability of an approximate version of this system that is linear in the 
parameters. In fact it is this linear version of the AIDS model that is 
typically estimated. 
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A system of inverse demand equations that resembles the AIDS model can 
be derived from a properly specified and flexible distance function. The 
proposed Linear Inverse Demand System (LIDS), although similar in structure 
to the AIDS, does not claim the same aggregation properties. Nonetheless, 
the simplicity of its linear structure and its approximation abilities are 
likely to make this system of interest for empirical studies. 
Consider the cost function C(p,u) underlying the PIGLOG preferences: 
In C - a(p) + ub(p) (23) 
where a(p) and b(p) are defined as: 
a(p) - OQ + Zi Inpi + h Sj Inp^  Inpj 
b(p) - pQ p/k 
The cost function C(p,u) is homogeneous of degree one in p, when the 
following restrictions apply: - 1, - 0, and In 
addition, symmetry implies 7£j - 7ji. 
Appealing to the concept of "symmetric duality" discussed by Hanoch 
(1978), it is always possible to represent preferences (or technology) 
uniquely by a distance function D(x,u) which behaves with respect to 
(x;l/u) in exactly the same way as the cost function C(p,u) behaves with 
respect to (p;u). Hence, from the PIGLOG cost function of the AIDS model 
(23), one can immediately write down its "polar" (in Hanoch's terminology) 
distance function. However, this distance function is not dual to C(p,u). 
It follows that the aggregation properties of the PIGLOG cost function are 
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not shared by its polar distance function. 
Consider the following parametric specification for the distance 
function D(x,u) which is the symmetric dual to the cost function (23): 
In D - a(x) + (l/u)b(x) (24) 
where a(x) and b(x) are quantity aggregator functions defined as: 
a(x) - OQ + 01^  lnx£ + 4 Ej Inxj^  Inxj (25) 
b(x) - P q % x/k (26) 
Because D(x,u) is homogeneous of degree one in x, the following 
restrictions apply: - 1, - 0, and Sj^ ySj^ -O. Once again, 
symmetry implies - 7ji. 
The derivative property (9) applied to the distance function yields 
compensated inverse demands as — 3D/ôxj^  • ^^(x.u), where is the 
normalized price of the i^  ^good (the nominal price divided by total 
expenditure). Because at D-1 the distance function is an implicit form of 
the direct utility function, (24) implies the utility function U - -
b(x)/a(x). This, together with the derivative property, implies that the 
uncompensated inverse demand functions associated with (24) can be written 
in share form as: 
wi - oi + Sj InXj - InX (27) 
l^ Eales and Unnevehr (1991) independently developed a very similar 
model derived from a distance function that is identical in structure to 
the PIGLOG cost function. Although their specification Is different from 
the distance function motivated by the concept of symmetric duality, the 
derived inverse demands are identical to ours. The developed model was 
applied to U.S. meat demand. 
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where • Pi^ i is the budget share, and InX Is a quantity index 
defined as InX • a(x). Equations (27) and (25) together entail a nonlinear 
structure for the inverse demand model. In practice, however, InX can be 
replaced by an index InX* constructed prior to estimation of the share 
system, thereby making (27) a linear system of equations. Many index 
formulae may be considered here. If quantities are properly scaled, one 
may use the geometric index InX* - w^  Inx^ , although other indices (say 
superlative indices)^ ® may have better approximation properties. 
The inverse demand system presented here satisfies standard 
flexibility properties. In particular, if n is the number of goods, the 
resulting demand system (27) provides a local approximation to an arbitrary 
demand system in that its (n-l)(n+4)/2 free parameters can be chosen to 
represent at a point an arbitrary set of quantity elasticities [of which 
hn(n+l)—1 are independent] and an arbitrary set of left-hand-side shares 
(of which (n-1) are independent]. It can be verified that the distance 
function (24)-(26) has enough parameters to be a flexible functional form 
for an arbitrary distance function once it is realized that the ordinality 
1 An index number is said to be exact for a function f(.) if the ratio 
of the value of f(.) between any two periods is identically equal to the 
values of the index. An index number is said to be superlative if it is 
exact for a functional form f(.) that can provide a second order 
approximation to an arbitrary homogeneous aggregator function (i.e., a 
FFF). Since the aggregator a(x) is itself a Translog FFF, the Tornquist 
quantity index which is exact for a Translog f(.) can be used. The Paasche 
and Laspeyres quantity and price Indexes approximate the superlative 
indexes to the first order and for time series data provide acceptable 
approximations (Diewert 1987). 
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of utility always allows one to put 3^ 1nD/a(l/u)2 - 0 at a point. 
Simulation results 
To illustrate the approximation properties of the LIDS model presented 
here, a small simulation exercise was carried out. Shares for a 3-good 
system are generated using the inverse share equations of the Linear 
Expenditure System (LES)^ ®, that is: 
wj - (28) 
The parameters and the data that are used are those employed by Wales 
(1984), except that the price series used by him are treated as the 
quantity series.In particular, the parameters used are 
«-[0.2,0.4,0.4] and ^ -[0.2,0.1,0.3]. From this structure 200 samples were 
generated, each with 40 observations, by appending multinormal disturbances 
[from the covariance matrix also used by Wales (1984)] to these shares. 
^^ This can be shown by differentiating the logarithmic transformation 
of the identity U[x/D(x,u)] • u and noting that one can always find a 
monotonie transformation of the utility such that S^ Sjfl^ u/âlnxj^ ôlnXj - 0 at 
a point. A similar 'money metric scaling' is assumed in the AIDS model as 
pointed out by Diewert and Wales (1988a). 
®^The LES is derived from the Stone-Geary utility function 
U - (xj^ -7)'*i which belongs to the class of quasi-homothetic preferences. 
^^ The price and income series (of 40 observations) used by Wales were 
generated such that they tend, on average, to grow at a constant rate 
(higher for income than for prices, and varying among the latter), modified 
by random shocks. While some of the random shocks affect all the series 
(to reflect the role of the business cycles), some of the shocks affect 
Individual series only. Thus the data generation process tries to 
replicate the real world data as closely as possible (Kiefer and MacKinnon 
1976). The series are normalized to equal unity at observation 21. 
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With these data, the LIDS model was estimated 200 times (using the 
geometric index InX* - EjWjlnXj), For the purpose of comparison, the true 
LES model (28) was also estimated, along with the inverse Translog (TL) 
system introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1975), which is: 
"i + i^1 In X; 
Wi — (29) 
1 + Sj In Xj 
with the normalization - 0, which is justified because we are 
seeking a local approximation, and one can always find a monotonie 
transformation of utility such that ô^ u/âlnx^ ainxj - 0 at a point. 
Hence, both LIDS and TL have 7 free parameters in this application. 
The approximation properties of the models considered can be 
illustrated in terms of the quantity and scale elasticities defined 
earlier. These elasticities were computed at the median observation point 
(at which x^ -l, VI) for each of the 200 replications, and summary 
statistics for the own-quantity and scale elasticities are reported in 
Table 1 below. 
The first column of this Table reports the true elasticities at this 
point. Then, for each of LES, LIDS, and TL the mean of the estimated 
elasticities are reported. The mean of the absolute deviation (MAD) of 
these estimates from the true elasticities, computed over the 200 
replications, as well as the average MAD computed over the entire set of 12 
elasticities are computed and reported. 
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Table 1. A comparison of Inverse demand systems 
Blast- True LES TL LIDS 
city value mean MAD mean MAD mean MAD 
fll -1.201 
2^2 -1.072 
f33 -1.235 
kl -0.968 
k2 -0.829 
k3 -1.147 
average MAD 
-1 ,183 0. 085 
-1, ,061 0. 052 
-1, ,221 0. 067 
-0, 968 0. 012 
-0. 834 0. 025 
-1. 143 0. 019 
0.039 
-1.157 0.117 
-1.136 0.118 
-1.454 0.223 
-0.913 0.072 
-0.799 0.057 
-1.194 0.052 
0.126 
-1.154 0.120 
-1.021 0.097 
-1.361 0.141 
-0.873 0.098 
-0.820 0.045 
-1.195 0.055 
0.106 
All models seem to provide a reasonable approximation. As expected, the 
best results are obtained by estimating the true LES model. The 
performance of LIDS and TL are similar, with LIDS actually being slightly 
better.20 
2®0ne might wonder if the inverse demand system with the nonlinear 
quantity index InX performs better than the linear approximation using 
InX*. This was checked in the simulation exercise and it was found that 
two systems produced virtually identical results. In addition, the 
simulation exercise was repeated with the income and quantity series 
generated from a uniform distribution instead of the trended data with the 
same parameter and covariance values as before. The nature of the results 
did not change. 
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An Aggregable Flexible Inverse Demand System 
Inverse market demand systems such as the LIDS and the Translog 
satisfy the criteria of flexibility, but fail to meet the aggregation 
conditions necessary for the existence of market demands. A new flexible 
form that provides a second order approximation to an arbitrary utility 
function, and which belongs to the class of quasi-homothetic preferences is 
proposed.21 Inverse demand functions derived from this utility function 
represent valid aggregate market demands. 
A translog FFF for the utility function is specified in the displaced 
variable (x-7) as : 
In U - Og + Zi oj  ln(x£-7 j^ )  +(1/2) InCx^ -^ )^ ln(Xj—yj)  (30) 
where OQ, a^ 's, o^ j's and 7^ 's are parameters. When homogeneity of this 
utility function in the displaced variable is imposed, the FFF represents 
quasi-homothetic preferences. This can be formally stated as below. 
Proposition; Let U* be a utility function, twice continuously 
differentiable at x*. Let U(x-7) be FFF linearly homogeneous in (x-7), 
where 7 is a vector of constants. Then U(x-7) can provide a second order 
differential approximation to U* at the point x*.22 
21ln Gorman's (1980) words "..sufficiently smooth preferences can 
always be approximated quasi-homothetically in a given neighborhood, just 
as their Engel curves can be by straight lines," 
^^ Diewert (1980) shows that the GPF cost and indirect utility 
functions (for a local cardinalization of utility) can approximate 
arbitrary preferences to the second order and can be FFFs. 
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Proof: We have to choose 7 and U, linearly homogeneous in (x-7), so as to 
satisfy the following conditions, assuming U* > 0 and (x*-?) > 0: 
U*(x*) - Û(x-7) (31) 
au*(x*)/axi - aU(x*-7)/6xi i-l,2,...n (32) 
a2u*(x*)/axi3xj - 32û(x*-7)/axiaxj i,j-l,2,...n (33) 
Since U is a FFF, we can pick n(n-l)/2 elements of (33) freely. We next 
pick the n 7's such that (x*-7) • 0, i-l,2,...n, and solve the first n-1 
equations of (32) for dlj(x*-y)/dxj^ , i-1,2,. . .n-1. Since U is homogeneous 
in (x-7), 
aij(x*-7)/aXn - [U*(x*) -Si (aU(x*-7)/axi)(Xi-7i)]/(Xn-7n) 
where the summation over i is from 1 to n-1. Thus (31) is also satisfied. 
Using Wold's identity, we derive the following inverse (share) demand 
functions from (30): 
(Xi/(Xi-7i)) [ Oi + Z, 0£4 ln(x4-7,) ] 
Wi - (34) 
Zi «i (Xi/(Xi-7i)) + Sj Si «i j  (Xi / (Xi -7 i ) )  ln(Xj -7 j )  
Since the inverse demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in 
the «i's and aij,s, the normalization S^ a^ -l is made. (30) is homogeneous 
in the variable (x-7).The FFF satisfies this condition if Sio^ j-O and 
Sjo^ j-O. Symmetry implies that Oij-Oji, Put together, the restrictions to 
^^ When 7-O, (30) reduces to a homothetic utility function. 
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be Imposed on the model to be estimated are: 
1 and 
Sja^ j-O 
aij-aji 
(35a) 
(35b) 
(35c) 
Restrictions (35a) are the column restrictions. Given the column 
restriction Sj_a£j-0, the row restriction (35b) follow from the restrictions 
(35c) which arise from the symmetry of the Hessian of the utility function. 
Homogeneity of the demand functions as used in the direct demand sense is 
automatically satisfied since we use normalized prices. We cannot say 
anything about the homogeneity property of the inverse demand functions in 
the variable x.24 
Since the restrictions are not independent of each other, the n+1 
column restrictions along with the n(n-l)/2 symmetry restrictions imply the 
row restrictions (35b) leaving (n(n+l)/2)+n-l free parameters to be 
estimated (which is one more than the (n-l)(n+4)/2 parameters in the LIDS 
and the Translog models). 
In practice, for a large number of commodities, the denominator in 
(34) can be a large and unwieldy expression. One way to avoid this 
inconvenience would be to estimate share-ratio equations, w^ /w^ , 
i-1,2,...n-1, so that the denominator of these share ratio equations is the 
general, for a homogeneous utility function U(x), the inverse 
demand functions are homogeneous of degree —1 and the inverse share demands 
are homogeneous of degree zero in x. 
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simpler numerator of the n^  ^share equation In (34).^ 5 Each of the 
demand equations can be written as 
wi" / D 
where is the numerator of the 1^  ^share demand. The denominator is 
identical f or all the equations. The flexibilities derived can be written 
as 
71J *k®ik 
i^k - "k + -
(Xk-7k) Ni D 
and 
«11 - (W.-1) - - 1 
(Xi-7i) Nj D 
where . The scale elasticities are given by 
Mi - Sj 5ij 
for all i,j-1,2,...n. 
Z^ Gallant (1987) estimates differenced logarithmic shares, i.e., Inw^ -
InWjj for a system of direct demands derived from a Translog indirect 
utility function. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Flexible representations of Inverse demand systems are explored in 
this section of the dissertation. After briefly laying out the theory of 
inverse demands, the concept of flexibility and aggregation are discussed. 
Two new flexible inverse demands are proposed. 
The first of these is the Linear Inverse Demand System (LIDS). This 
specification is based on a distance function which can be interpreted as a 
polar form to the PIGLOG cost function underlying the AIDS model commonly 
used for direct demand models. The approximation properties of the model 
were Illustrated with a simulation exercise, and the performance of this 
model was found to be similar to that of a Translog inverse demand system. 
The simplicity and linearity of the model is likely to make it a useful 
specification for empirical applications. 
The second Inverse demand system is derived from a FFF that provides a 
quasi-homothetic second order approximation to an arbitrary utility 
function. This demand system satisfies the aggregation conditions 
necessary for the existence of market demand functions. Further research 
on this functional form both in simulation studies and with actual data is 
likely to reveal the approximating capability of this functional form. 
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SECTION II: NIXED DEMANDS: THE CANADIAN MARKET FOR MEATS 
Introduction 
A number of empirical studies In applied demand analysis use systems 
of demand equations that are specified In apparent Isolation from the 
supply side and estimated by seemingly unrelated regression techniques. To 
obtain consistent estimates of the underlying preference parameters, this 
approach typically relies on one of two assumptions: either prices are 
assumed predetermined or quantities are assumed predetermined. The first 
of these assumptions leads to quantity dependent or direct demand 
functions. This Is the usual representation of preferences that arises in 
the case of the consumer, who Is typically taken as making optimal 
consumption decisions for given prices and Income. Its use at the 
aggregate level is equivalent to assuming that supplies are perfectly 
elastic and that demands adjust to clear the market. This condition may 
hold for aggregate (market) data when one is modeling the demand of 
tradable goods in the case of a small open economy, or when prices are 
administratively set (e.g., public utilities). The alternative of assuming 
that quantities are predetermined, and that prices adjust to clear the 
market, leads to price dependent or inverse demand functions, an approach 
that may be useful when analyzing the demand for perishable products 
defined over a short period of time.l 
In addition to the two polar cases of direct and inverse demand 
S^ection I of the dissertation deals with Inverse demands. 
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functions, there is another class of models that allows one to sidestep the 
task of estimating both demand and supply functions in a simultaneous 
equations framework. This is the case of the "mixed demand" functions 
(Samuelson 1965, Chavas 1984) where the price of some goods are 
predetermined, such that their respective quantities demanded adjust to 
clear the market, while for the remaining set of goods it is the quantity 
supplied which is predetermined and prices must adjust to clear the 
market.2 Despite its obvious potential for applications, stemming from 
the fact of being a combination of the two polar cases discussed above, the 
mixed demand approach has been virtually ignored in empirical applications. 
The aim in this section is to develop a mixed demand model suitable 
for empirical applications, and to use it to analyze the demand for meat 
in Canada. The mixed demand approach appears particularly suited to the 
Canadian meat demand case. First of all, there is virtually free trade 
between U.S. and Canada for beef and pork. Because Canada is a small 
country in the North-American market, the assumptions that beef and pork 
prices are exogenous to the Canadian market appears a tenable one. On the 
other hand, Canadian imports of poultry products are restricted by an 
import quota (Moschini and Meilke 1991). This import quota insulates the 
domestic market, and the internal price formation mechanism heavily depends 
on the Institutional setting. In particular, chicken producers are 
organized in provincial Marketing Boards which are coordinated by the 
Canadian Chicken Marketing Agency. The objective of this monopoly-like 
2 Note the distinction between the mixed demand functions of interest 
here and the case of rationed demands (Neary and Roberts 1980), for which 
some markets do not clear. 
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organization Is to guarantee producers a favorable price, and this 
objective is pursued by limiting the output in the market. This "supply 
management" is enforced by production quotas which are first allocated to 
each province and then to the individual producers. Hence, for chicken it 
seems that equilibrium is characterized by exogenously determined supply 
with price adjusting to clear the market.^  
In specifying an empirical model of mixed demands, FFFs cannot be used 
as in the case of direct or inverse demands. This is because the 
optimization process involves knowledge of both the direct and indirect 
utility functions, and most FFFs do not have a closed form dual 
representations. The alternative of using a FFF for the 'mixed' utility 
function is also not possible since the derivative property cannot be 
implemented to derive mixed demands, as will be elucidated in the following 
sub-section. Given this, our strategy is to approximate the mixed demand 
equations directly with a differential approach. While a FFF provides an 
approximation to the true function in the variable space, the differential 
model can be viewed as an approximation in the parameter space that can 
also satisfy a meaningful definition of flexibility. 
To do this, we first develop the theory of mixed demands using the 
concept of 'virtual' or shadow prices (Gorman 1976, Neary and Roberts 
T^he Farm Products Marketing Act of 1972 allowed the creation of 
marketing boards which led to the establishment of the Canadian Egg 
Marketing Agency in 1972, the Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency in 1973 and 
the Canadian Chicken Marketing Agency in 1978. Along with the Canadian 
Dairy Commission which existed since 1966, these agencies effectively 
became supply-restricting boards with considerable powers (Van Kooten 
1987). For the case of chicken, import quotas were introduced in 1979, so 
that supply management for the chicken industry became fully operational by 
the end of that year. 
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1980). A 'mixed' cost function is derived using which the Slutsky 
relations are derived for the mixed demand system. These relations 
expressed in terms of 'mixed' elasticities are employed in the 
specification of the mixed differential demand system. Finally, the 
proposed model is estimated using Canadian market data for beef, pork and 
chicken. In addition to the mixed differential demand system, the direct 
differential (Rotterdam) model and the mixed LES are also estimated. 
Finally, an ad hoc specification of the first stage of budget allocation is 
also estimated from which unconditional mixed elasticities are computed. 
This section is organized as follows. The theory of mixed demand 
functions is discussed, followed by the specification of our differential 
mixed demand system and the other models that are estimated. The data used 
in the application is then described, and the estimation results are 
presented and discussed. The main points of this section are then 
summarized. 
Theory of Mixed Demands 
The problem can be stated as follows (Samuelson 1965, Chavas 1984). 
Let the n commodity bundle x be partitioned into x^ -(x]^ ,X2,...x^ ) and 
Xfi-CXm+i,.•.Xn). x^  is the vector of quantities optimally chosen given the 
corresponding normalized prices %A-(*i, . . .*m), and TB-(«'ni+l'• •-""n^  is the 
optimal price vector given the quantity (supply) vector xg. These n-'s are 
normalized prices; if pj^  denotes the nominal price of good i, and Y the 
total expenditure on all the commodities, then ir^ -pj^ /Y. The constrained 
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optimization problem is given by 
Max UCx^ .Xg) - V(,ry^ ,^ g) s.t + XB'*B " ^ (1) 
where U and V are the direct and indirect utility functions , quasi-concave 
and quasi-convex in their respective arguments. The solution to this 
problem is given by the Marshallian mixed demands, x^ (xg,jr^ ,l) and 
jrg(xB,jry^ ,l). Clearly, at the optimum, U(x^ (XB,»r^ ,l) .Xg.w^ .^l) -
V(7r^ ,5r3(xB,irA,l)) - V where V is the 'mixed' utility function that is 
homogeneous of degree zero in p^  and Y. Hence V(xB,?r^ ,1)-V(xb,p^ ,Y). 
Alternatively, the optimization problem can be stated as the 
optimization of the sub-problems (Chavas 1984) 
V(XB,*A,1) - Max { UCx^ .Xg) s.t. t -^x  ^+ Xb'ÎbCxb.tt ,^1) - 1 ) (2a) 
XA 
and 
V(xg,jrA,l) - Min { V(irp^ ,KQ) s.t. w^ 'X^(xb,1) + xg-ng - 1 ) (2b) 
'^ B 
Applying the envelope theorem obtains: 
3V/ 3pj n 
*1 - S (apk/api)xk (3a) 
k-m+1 
av/  dY 
and 
_ av/ axjj m 
-Pk " ~ + ^ (gx^/axk) p£ (3b) 
i-1 
av/ aY 
Denoting by A the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint in (2) and 
(3), the marginal utility of income is denoted by dV/dY- À/Y. 
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The mixed demand functions x^ Cxg.jr^ ,!) and 1) satisfy some 
restrictions. First of all, they satisfy the adding up condition t *^x  ^+ 
xg-ng — 1 implied by the budget constraint. Secondly, the homogeneity 
condition implies that x^ (xg,jr^ ,l) is homogeneous of degree zero in 
nominal prices and income, i.e., xy^ (xg,jr^ ,l)-x^ (xg,p^ ,Y). Similarly, the 
optimal nominal prices for group B are homogeneous of degree one in (p^ .Y), 
implying that 5rg(xg,w^ ,l) are homogeneous of degree zero in (p^ ,Y) and 
hence *B(xg,*A,l)-âg(xg,PA,Y). 
We now define the Marshallian 'mixed elasticities' as 
%ij - (axi/apj)(pj/Xi) 
i^k - (axi/axk)(xk/xi) 
fki - (apk/3Pi)(Pi/Pk) 
<^ ks - (apk/axg)(xg/pk) k,seB 
ieA, keB 
ieA, keB 
iJeA 
The 'mixed' income elasticities are defined by 
i7i - (axi/aY)(Y/Xi) 
"k - (apk/a?)(Y/Pk) keB 
ieA 
The adding-up restrictions can now be expressed in terms of the 
elasticities as follows: 
i^eA Wi '?ij + ^ keB ^ k Pkj ' ~ 
SieA "i ^ is + ^ keB ^ k ^ ks " " ^s 
i^GA "i + ^ keB "k ^ k - 1 
seB 
where w^  is the share of the i^  ^commodity. The homogeneity conditions can 
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also be expressed in terms of elasticities as follows: 
j^eA ''ij + %l - 0 lEA 
j^eA fkj + *k - 1 kEB 
From duality theory, we know that preferences can be represented by a 
cost function just as they can be by a utility function. To derive the 
'mixed' cost function, we first consider the restricted cost function where 
the vector of commodities Xg are treated as 'fixed' (Gorman, 1976). Given 
these 'fixed' commodities, the consumer allocates his or her income 
optimally to the other commodities that can be chosen. 
C(XB,PA'U) - Win { p '^X^  s.t. U(x^,Xb) - u ) (4) 
C(.) is homogeneous of degree one and concave in py^  and convex and 
decreasing in xg.^  From the derivative property, the partial derivative 
of C(.) with respect to py^  gives the compensated mixed demands xj(xg,p^ ,u) 
ac/api - xf (xg.PA.u) ieA 
while the partial derivative with respect to Xg gives the compensated 
shadow or 'virtual' price of xg. 
ôC/axjç pg (xg,PA,u) keB 
These virtual prices, at the market level, can be interpreted as those 
(market clearing) prices which would support the consumption bundle Xg 
D^eaton (1981) formally proves that C(.) is decreasing and convex in X g .  
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given prices p^  and income C(.).5 The negative sign in front of pg is 
because an increase in xj^  holding utility constant would require less of at 
least one commodity of implying a decrease of p^ '^ A* Th^  virtual prices 
themselves are expressed in positive terms. The virtual prices expressed 
as functions of Xg, p^ , and u can be considered the compensated price 
dependent demand of Xg. Curvature and symmetry conditions imply that the 
matrix of partial derivatives [3x^ /3py^ ] is symmetric and negative semi-
definite; the matrix of partial derivatives [3pg/3xg] is symmetric and 
negative definite; and from Young's theorem, flxJ/flxj^  - ô^ C/ap^ axj^  -
3^ C/3xjj3p£ - -6p^  /5Pl for all ieA,keB. These three conditions imply that 
the Hessian of the restricted cost function is skew symmetric. 
We now define the compensated mixed elasticities as follows: 
- (ax£/apj)(pj/xi) i.jeA 
" (ax%/axk)(xk/xi) iGA,keB 
pgi - (apG/aPi)(Pi/Pk) iGA, keB 
ê^s - (apG/axs)(Xs/Pk) k.seB 
Since the restricted cost function is homogeneous of degree one in p^ , the 
compensated demands x^  are homogeneous of degree zero in p^ , while the 
compensated (nominal) price dependent demands are homogeneous of degree one 
in p^ . The homogeneity restrictions in terms of the compensated 
elasticities are: 
I^n relation to consumer demand under rationing (e.g., Neary and 
Roberts.1980, Deaton 1981, and Howard 1977) this is the situation when the 
ration 'just' bites, in the sense that the ration levels coincide with the 
quantities which would have been chosen by an unrationed household facing 
the same prices and income. Latham (1980) uses a similar shadow price 
interpretation. 
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j^€A ''fj ~ ® IGA 
i^GA P^i  - 1 keB 
Given the symmetry conditions: Wj k^^ s^" "s^ sk' "i^ ïk" ~ 
WkP^ i the adding-up restrictions can now be expressed in terms of the 
compensated elasticities: 
i^eA ^ i ''fj ~ 0 
i^eA ^ i ^ îk k^ keB 
We now define the 'mixed' cost function as the sum of the restricted cost 
function and the value of the 'fixed' commodity bundle evaluated at its 
virtual price: 
C(xB,PA,u) - Cfxg.pA.u) + p§ (xb,Pa,u)-Xb (5) 
This mixed cost function implies that, if p^  and pg were exogenous, with pg 
equal to the virtual price of the fixed bundle Xg, given income level 
Y-C(xb,p^ ,u), the optimal quantity choices would be precisely x^  and Xg, 
the solution vector and the fixed quantity bundle, respectively, of the 
earlier restricted optimization problem.® From (5) we have, 
ac/api - xj + z^ gg (apG/8pi) xj^  (6a) 
aç/axjç - Sggg (ap§/3xjj) Xg (6b) 
and 
d^c/dx^dpi  -  a^ c/ap^ ôxg - axj/axg + Sj^ gg (s^ p^ /axg^ pj^ ) + apg/ap^  
Let us now consider the identities: 
®The mixed cost function C always exists as long as there is some ieA. 
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xf (xB.PA.u) - XA(XB'PA'C(XB'PA'U)) 
(XB.PA'U) - PA(XB'PA'C(xB,PA.u)) 
Differentiating these identities and using the relations (6), we have the 
following Slutsky equations: 
axf/apj - axi/apj + (axi/aY)(xj + s^ eB (apg/apj) Xk) 
axf/axk - axi/axk + (âx^/dY)(z^ea (apC/ax^ ) Xg) 
3pg/api - apk/api + (ap^ /aYXxj + (ap°/apj_) Xg 
apg/axg - apk/axg + (api^ /aYXSj-gg (apg/axg) Xj. 
In terms of elasticities, the Slutsky relations are: 
''îj " ''ij + *71 +^ keB"k Z'k^ ) i.jeA 
î^k ~ ^ ik + %i(2seBWs*s&) e^B 
fièi - fki + *k(Wi +2seBWsPsf) 
^ês •" ^ks ^k^^reB^r *rs) k.sGB 
(7a )  
(7b )  
(7c )  
(7d )  
As in the case of direct and inverse demands, the compensated elasticities 
are the sum of the uncompensated elasticities and the income effect. The 
income effect in the mixed case is the product of the 'mixed' income 
elasticities and a weighted income share, where the weights are the 
compensated mixed elasticities themselves. 
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Model Specification 
The theoretical formulation (1) from which mixed demands are derived 
is not very useful in specifying an empirical model because knowledge of 
both the direct and the indirect utility functions is required. This rules 
out using one of the commonly adopted FFFs because they do not have a 
closed form dual. For example, if one were to specify the direct utility 
function in terms of the Translog form used by Christensen, Jorgenson, and 
Lau (1975), there would be no closed form dual functional form that could 
consistently and simultaneously represent the indirect utility function.? 
The other alternative of specifying a FFF for the 'mixed' utility function 
as derived in (2) is also not useful since the derivative property (3) 
cannot be used to derive estimable mixed demands. One possible solution to 
the specification of a flexible empirical model for mixed demands is to 
approximate the mixed (market) demands locally at some point using a 
differential demand system like the Rotterdam model (Barnett 1979). 
One criticism that has been raised against the Rotterdam model is that 
it implies unitary income elasticities (Phlips 1974, p.88). Barnett 
(1979), however, shows that this is not true. He performs an aggregation 
analysis based on an infinitesimal (absolute) version of the Rotterdam 
O^ne class of preferences for which a closed form dual always exists 
Is the class of self—dual additive preferences for which the indirect 
utility function can be written in the same mathematical form as the 
corresponding direct utility function. However, all such preferences (with 
one exception, see Hicks, 1969) imply unitary income elasticities and are 
thus very restrictive (Houthakker 1960, Samuelson 1965). The Linear 
Expenditure System belongs to the generalized Bergson Family for which a 
closed form indirect utility function exists. For this class of 
preferences, the Engel curves are linear. 
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model with random coefficients. The result is that the Rotterdam model 
with constant parameters provides a first order Taylor-series approximation 
to some theoretical system of equations at the per capita level under 
conditions far weaker than those necessary for aggregate integrability.® 
Theil (1980, p.178) points out that the Rotterdam can be viewed as a linear 
approximation even without invoking the considerations that Barnett does. 
As Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p.73) point out, unitary income 
elasticities are implied only when the differential demands are required to 
be consistent demand functions in levels. More recently, Mountain (1988) 
showed that the Rotterdam, like other FFFs, is a valid linear approximation 
in variable space at the individual consumer level. 
Constancy of parameters over the sample period is assumed to 
facilitate estimation. In reply to Byron (1984) who states this as a 
criticism of the Rotterdam model, Barnett (1984) points out that the 
Rotterdam like the Taylor series expansions (FFFs) is after all a local 
approximation. In all such models, constancy of parameters is acquired by 
the device of evaluating the parameters at a 'point of approximation'.^  
Barnett, however, notes that constancy of parameters acquired in such a 
manner are often not acceptable empirically, and is in general a testable 
hypothesis. Constancy of the parameters, however, also raises the issue of 
®Barnett(1979) dismisses Muellbauer's (1976) class of PIGL preferences 
as a highly restrictive case . Keller and Van Driel (1985) however develop 
a relative price version of the Rotterdam which has PIGLOG Engel curves and 
in which concavity conditions can be implemented. 
T^hls reasoning also applies to Keller and Van Oriel's (1985) comment 
that the Rotterdam model implies linear Engel curves. This observation 
apparently stems from inferring that constant parameters implies constant 
marginal budget shares, which as in the case of the LES, implies quasi-
homothetic preferences. 
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approximation errors. In response to Byron's statement that the Rotterdam 
possesses errors of the first order, Barnett (1979) points out that the 
remainder term is of at least second order and cites empirical tests none 
of which reject the hypothesis of constant parameters. Byron (1984) in a 
simulation study shows that the Rotterdam mimics the Translog and the LES 
well under the assumption of constant parameters.^ ® 
Given that the differential demand system provides a flexible 
approximation to an arbitrary demand system, a differential approximation 
for mixed demands is now proposed. Totally differentiating the mixed 
demands x^ (xb,p^ ,Y) and PB(xg,py^ ,Y) we have the following differential 
'mixed' demand system in absolute prices: 
wj^ dlnx^  - wj^ tj^ dlnY + Sj w^  dlnpj + w^  dlnxj^  (8a) 
wjjdlnpjj - wjjtjjjdlnY + Sj wj^  dlnpj + Sg wj^  dlnxj^  (8b) 
for all i,jeA, and k,seB; where Y is the total expenditure as before, and p 
and X are the nominal prices and quantities respectively. Using the 
Slutsky relations (7) of the previous section, and imposing the symmetry 
restrictions we have: 
w^ dlnx^  - a^ dlny + Zj (aij+aiEZk-yjk] )dlnpj + Zk('yik-°:i[^ s/^ ks] )dlnx^  
(9a) 
Wkdlnpk - /3k^lny + 2:j (-"Yjk+i^k[^s^js] )j + SgC^ks-^ktSr^rslidlnxk 
(9b) 
l^ Barnett (1984) points out that theoretically, the magnitudes of the 
remainder terms in the Rotterdam and the Translog are not directly 
comparable since the models possess differently transformed variables. 
Thus any comparison must be from simulation studies. 
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where dlny is equal to dlnY-S^ w^ dlnp^ , i-l,2...m. The parameters are 
defined by: 
"ij- wiqfj- Wj nji 
7ik- Wi^ Ek- -Wk%Bi 
k^s" *'k^ ês~ *s^ sk 
«i- Wi»?i 
P\r Wk*k 
The model is linear in the variables but nonlinear in the parameters. 
Homogeneity is satisfied when: 
SjQ^ j - 0 
2i7ik - -^ k 
The adding—up conditions for the model are: 
2i*i + Sjj^ k ~ 1 
i^®ij ~ 0 
2i7ik • -Wk 
The direct elasticities implied by the mixed system^  ^ can be compared to 
the direct elasticities yielded by the direct Rotterdam which is specified 
in the absolute price version (Beaton and Muellbauer 1980) as: 
^^ The correspondence between the direct and mixed elasticities is 
given by , e^ —and egg—This is obtained 
by rearranging the mixed demand system in (8) to yield the direct 
differential system. r],}f>,p and 6 are the matrices of mixed elasticities of 
size mxm, mx(n-m), (n-m)xm and (n-m)x(n-m) respectively. Dahlgran (1987) 
uses this identity to derive a mixed differential demand system from the 
direct Rotterdam. 
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wjdlnx^  - 0£ dlny + Sj aj_j dlnpj 
where the rate of change of real income dlny is with respect to all the 
prices, i.e., dlny - dlnY-S^ wj^ dlnp^ , i-1,2,...n;^  ^ - w^ e^ , where e^  
i s  t h e  i n c o m e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  t h e  i ^ ^  g o o d ;  a n d  a ^ j  -  w ^ e ^ ^  ,  w h e r e  e i s  
the compensated price elasticity. Homogeneity implies that Zja^ j - 0; 
symmetry implies that and adding-up implies that - 1 and 
i^®ij "" ® • 
The differential mixed demand system is also compared to the non-
flexible system of mixed demands derived from the Stone-Geary utility 
function 
U(q) - n In (XI - - 1 
For the three good case under consideration, the 'mixed'(share dependent) 
linear expenditure system (LES) is given by: 
Wi - *171 + /3i / (x3"73+73^ 3) i-1,2 
W3 - *3^ 3 (l-^ ieA'^ i'Ti) / (x j -y j+Js^s)  
The variables subscripted by 1 and 2 stand for beef and pork while the 
variables subscripted by 3 stand for chicken. 
^^ dlny as defined in the direct Rotterdam is also equal to the Divisia 
quantity index. To see this , totally differentiate the budget constraint 
to get dY-SiPidxi+ZiXidPi from which dlnY-SiWidlnxi+SiWidlnPi. The two 
terms on the right are the Divisia quantity and price indexes. 
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Data 
Quarterly Canadian data on consumption and prices (obtained from 
Agriculture Canada) for beef, pork and chicken from the first quarter of 
1980 to the first quarter of 1990 are used. The quantity data are per 
capita disappearance (in kilograms) of beef, pork and chicken. The 
quantities were converted from carcass weights to retail weights using 
conversion factors supplied by Statistics Canada. The conversion factor 
for beef was 0.74 from 1980 to 1985 and 0.73 from 1986 to 1990. The 
conversion factor for pork was 0.77 from 1980 to 1982 and 0.76 from 1983 to 
1990. The price data are consumer price indexes (with 1981 as base year) 
converted to actual prices using survey data obtained from Family Food 
Expenditure Surveys, Statistics Canada. This was done as follows. From 
the data on weekly family expenditures and quantities consumed (for all 
classes and all provinces) for beef, pork and chicken, prices were computed 
for the three commodities by dividing expenditures by quantities for the 
years 1974, 1976, 1978, 1982, 1984 and 1986. These prices were regressed 
(through the origin) on the respective annual consumer price indexes. The 
raw moment values were over 0.99 for all the three equations^  ^and the 
regression coefficients were 0.052, 0.037 and 0.029. These estimated 
coefficients were then used in generating prices for the entire sample 
period. 
Additional (quarterly) data used for the first stage of budget 
^^ The raw moment reported in SHAZAM for regressions through the 
origin is computed as 1-RSS/TSS, where RSS is the residual sum of squares, 
while TSS is the total sum of squares without correcting for the mean. 
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allocation included total food expenditure and consumer price index for 
food provided by Agriculture Canada; the consumer price index (CPI) and 
personal disposable income converted to a per capita basis using quarterly 
estimates of Canadian population. 
Estimation and Results 
The discrete formulation of the mixed Rotterdam model in (9) and the 
direct Rotterdam model are estimated using the nonlinear estimation 
procedure available in SHAZAM 6.2. Since quarterly data is used, a four-
period difference is taken to correct for seasonality. The shares used in 
multiplying each of the equations are averages of two consecutive quarters 
(as opposed to contiguous quarters). For example, in the beef equation, 
corresponding to dlogp|)(.-logpy(.-logpy(._^ , the share is (wij{._4+wjj{.)/2 where 
py(. and wjjj. denote the price and expenditure share of beef and t denotes 
time. The mixed LES model is also estimated using the nonlinear estimation 
procedure. Symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are maintained and the 
chicken equation is dropped in the estimation of all the three models. In 
this analysis it is assumed that the meats group is weakly separable from 
other commodities in the consumption bundle. 
The mixed differential model Is estimated with an intercept and 
correction for first order autocorrelation^ ,^ where the coefficient of 
^^ The model was also estimated with single period differencing but 
with an AR(4) error process and dummy variables to account for seasonality. 
This model yielded elasticities close to those of the model with four-
period differencing. 
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correlation was also estimated.The Intercept In this differential 
model Is a trend coefficient since the first difference of the trend 
variable yields a vector of ones. The intercept can be Interpreted as 
change in the expenditure share^ ® and from the budget constraint, these 
share changes must add up to zero. 
The estimates of the mixed demand system are presented in Table 1. 
The coefficients cn^ l and (which are weighted compensated elasticities 
of beef and chicken, respectively) have the expected negative signs. The 
income coefficients are positive. The Intercepts in the beef and pork 
equations are negative implying that the budget shares of beef and pork 
have been falling while the share of chicken has been rising. From the 
eigenvalues of the sub-matrix of the coefficients of the mixed system 
concavity conditions were found to be satisfied. 
The estimated mixed compensated elasticities obtained by dividing the 
estimated coefficients by the relevant mean shares, and their asymptotic 
standard errors, are reported in Table 2. The ratios of the elasticities 
to their respective standard errors are asymptotically normally 
distributed. Beef and pork are net substitutes while chicken is a 
^^ The model was estimated with seasonal dummies for the quarters. The 
dummies were found to be insignificant indicating that the four-period 
differencing was also effective in removing seasonality from the data. A 
likelihood ratio test showed that the model without dummies could not be 
rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. 
®^The left-hand-side of the 1^  ^(quantity) dependent equation is 
Wj'dlnx^ , or (pj^ xj/Y) (dx^ /x^ ) which can be written as (p£/Y)dx£ which is the 
change in the 1^ " expenditure share since p^  and Y are exogenous. 
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Table 1. Estimates of the mixed demand system 
Coefficient Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
=1 0.5441 0.0468 11.63 
"2 0.2879 0.0419 6.87 
«11 -0.0946 0.0276 -3.43 
n3 -0.1485 0.0236 -6.31 
hz -0.2692 0.0526 -5.12 
rho 0.5236 0.1146 4.57 
Trend 
beef -0.0083 0.0035 -2.34 
pork -0.0034 0.0033 -1.02 
Log likelihood function: 257.8646 
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Table 2. Compensated and Marshalllan mixed elasticities 
at the mean 
Compensated mixed elasticities 
Pfi Pp Xc 
-0.1923 0.1923 -0 .3019 
(0.0561)* (0.0561) (0. 0479) 
0.2929 -0.2929 -0 .1129 
(0.0855) (0.0855) (0. 0729) 
0.8028 0.1972 -1 .4550 
(0.1273) (0.1273) (0. 2842) 
Marshalllan mixed elasticities 
Pg Pp Xq Expenditure 
-0.9007 -0.2053 -0.0042 1.1059 
(0.0999) (0.0612) (0.0731) (0.0951) 
-0.2781 -0.6133 0.1269 0.8914 
(0.1309) (0.0916) (0.0797) (0.1298) 
0.2213 -0.1292 -1.2106 0.9079 
(0.1833) (0.1108) (0.2102) (0.1946) 
s^tandard errors of the elasticities are reported in parentheses. 
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substitute to both beef and pork.^  ^ For instance, the mixed elasticity 
ippQ of -0.1129 shows that a one percentage increase in the supply of 
chicken causes about one—tenth of a percent decrease in the consumption of 
pork. The Marshalllan mixed elasticities are also reported in Table 2. 
Beef and pork are found to be gross complements. Chicken is found to be a 
substitute for pork but a complement to beef. The own 'quantity' 
elasticity of chicken is greater than one in absolute value indicating that 
a one percent rise in the supply of chicken would, ceteris paribus, 
decrease the price of chicken by more than a percent. 
The mixed expenditure elasticities are close to unity for all the 
three commodities. For beef and pork, they indicate the usual change in 
consumption of the commodity due to a change in total expenditure. For 
chicken, however, the expenditure elasticity indicates how much more (or 
less) consumers (at the market level) are willing to pay for chicken when 
income Increases by one percent. For a normal good, one would expect this 
elasticity to be positive as seems to be the case for chicken. 
To compare the computed mixed elasticities with the more familiar 
direct elasticities estimated in other studies, the direct compensated 
Marshalllan elasticities and the direct expenditure elasticities are 
retrieved from the mixed elasticities. Looking at the retrieved 
Marshalllan elasticities in Table 3, we see that the own price elasticities 
of beef and chicken, at -0.9014 and -0.8260 are higher than that of pork 
which is -0.6269. The expenditure elasticities of beef and pork are close 
l^ Note that, in general, substitutabillty defined in terms of the 
'mixed' compensated elasticities need not be equivalent to either p-
substitutabllity defined in terms of the direct system, nor the q-
substltutablllty defined in terms of the inverse system. 
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Table 3. Direct elasticities at the mean retrieved 
from the mixed system 
Compensated direct elasticities 
Pfi Fp Pc 
-0.3588 0.1514 0.2075 
(0.0859)* (0.0607) (0.0553) 
0.2306 -0.3082 0.0776 
(0.0924) (0.0871) (0.0505) 
0.5518 0.1355 -0.6873 
(0.1469) (0.0882) (0.1343) 
Marshallian direct elasticities 
Pg Pp Pq Expenditure 
-0, ,9014 -0. 2048 0.0034 1, 1028 
(0, .1035) (0. 0628) (0.0608) (0, ,1054) 
-0, ,2548 -0. 6269 -0.1049 • 0, ,9866 
(0. ,1264) (0. 0885) (0.0601) (0, ,1469) 
0. 1828 -0. 1067 -0.8260 0. 7499 
(0. 1644) (0. 0899) (0.1434) (0. 1603) 
s^tandard errors of the estimates are reported in parenthesis 
67 
to unity, while that of chicken is 0.7499. In fact a likelihood ratio test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of homotheticity. 
These elasticities are compared to the elasticities of the direct 
Rotterdam whose parameter estimates are presented in Table 4. The model 
was estimated with an intercept and correction for first order 
autocorrelation. Once again beef and pork have negative time trends, and 
chicken, a positive trend. The compensated and Marshallian elasticities 
from the direct Rotterdam are reported in Table 5. 
The beef and pork own price (compensated and Marshallian) and 
expenditure elasticities from the direct Rotterdam are somewhat similar to 
the retrieved direct elasticities, but the absolute value of the own price 
elasticity of chicken can be seen to be much lower in the direct demand 
system.IB However, the chicken (own price) elasticity from the direct 
demand system is comparable to those from other studies on Canadian meat 
demand. For instance, Young (1987) using single equation models (for 
unconditional demands) for the period 1967-84 reports own price 
elasticities ranging from -0.31 to -0.48 for beef, -0.55 to -0.67 for pork 
and -0.22 to -0.47 for chicken. The income elasticities ranged from 0.14 
to 0.91 for beef, 0.21 to 0.39 for pork and 0.26 to 0.28 for chicken. 
However, the higher own-price elasticity of chicken is supported by 
Thurman (1986) and Shonkwiler and Taylor (1984) who show that a least 
squares estimation of quantity dependent demand system underestimates 
demand elasticities when prices are in fact endogenous. It may, therefore, 
be possible that the direct elasticities from the mixed system reflect the 
l^ Homotheticity is rejected in the direct system both at the one and 
five percent significant levels. 
Table 4. Estimates of the direct demand system 
Equation dlny dlnPfi dlnPp dlnPc Intercept Rho* 
Beef c^  0.5696 -0.1314 0.0858 0.0456 -0.0069 0.4007 
se*^  (0.0452) (0.0283) (0.0232) (0.0146) (0.0024) (0.1139) 
t«i (12.60) (-4.63) (3.69) (3.12) (-2.90) (3.52) 
Pork 0.3276 0.0858 -0.0992 0.0135 -0.0009 0.4007 
(0.0474) (0.0232) (0.0241) (0.0107) (0.0024) (0.1139) 
(6.91) (3.69) (-4.12) (1.25) (-0.38) (3.52) 
R^ho-coefficient of autocorrelation 
c—coefficients 
s^e-standard errors 
t—'t' ratios 
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Table 5. Compensated and Marshalllan elasticities 
at the mean from the direct system 
Compensated direct elasticities 
Pc 
-0.2669 0.1743 0.0927 
(0.0576)* (0.0471) (0.0297) 
0.2655 -0.3072 0.0417 
(0.0718) (0.0745) (0.0332) 
0.2465 0.0728 -0.3193 
(0.0791) (0.0579) (0.0608) 
Marshalllan direct elasticities 
Pg Pp Pg Expenditure 
-0.8366 -0.1996 -0.1215 1, 1576 
(0.0819) (0.0500) (0.0334) (0, ,0919) 
-0.2335 -0.6348 -0.1459 1. ,0142 
(0.1114) (0.0799) (0.0435) (0, ,1468) 
-0.0270 -0.1068 -0.4221 0. 5559 
(0.1047) (0.0630) (0.0644) (0. 1178) 
s^tandard errors of the elasticities are reported in parenthesis. 
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true elasticities Implying that the demand for chicken in the Canadian 
market is more elastic than suggested by previous studies. 
The mixed LES is estimated with a time trend and dummy variables to 
correct for seasonality. We can now compare the performance of this non-
flexible functional form to the differential approximation of mixed 
demands. The estimates of the mixed LES are reported in Table 6 below. 
Table 6. Estimates of the mixed LES 
fl P 2  fi 72 73 
Coefficient 0.5841 
(11.56)* 
0.2647 
(7.76) 
1.8828 
(1.84) 
2.9128 
(8.58) 
0.8134 
(1.07) 
equation Dl 02 D3 trend 
Beef -0.0043 
(-1.32) 
0.0196 
(5.19) 
0.0209 
(5.60) 
-0.0022 
(-11.21) 
Pork -0.0059 
(-1.99) 
-0.0315 
(-9.60) 
-0.0309 
(-9.43) 
-0.0002 
(-1.43) 
f^igures in parenthesis are 't' ratios 
Once again the time trend in the beef and pork equations are negative. 
The estimated y's are less than the respective quantities for all the 
observations indicating that concavity conditions are not violated. The 
mixed Harshalllan and expenditure elasticities are presented in Table 7 
along with the retrieved direct elasticities. Except for the mixed income 
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Table 7. Mixed elasticities and retrieved elasticities from the 
mixed LES 
LES Marshallian mixed elasticities 
PB Pp Xc Expenditure 
XB -0.8958 
(0.0735) 
-0.1709 
(0.0283) 
0.0281 
(0.0289) 
1.0667 
(0.1004) 
Xp -0.0954 
(0.0671) 
-0.6527 
(0.0565) 
0.0197 
(0.0204) 
0.7482 
(0.0985) 
Pc -0.1791 
(0.1419) 
-0.2250 
(0.0439) 
-1.1718 
(0.1259) 
1.4042 
(0.1819) 
LES retrieved direct Marshallian elasticities 
Pb Pp Pc Expenditure 
XB -0,9001 
(0.0712) 
-0.1763 
(0.0294) 
-0.0239 
(0,0221) 
1.1004 
(0.1151) 
Xp -0.0985 
(0.0693) 
-0.6565 
(0.0523) 
-0,0168 
(0.0156) 
0,7718 
(0.1063) 
Xc -0.1529 
(0.1104) 
-0.1920 
(0.0480) 
-0.8534 
(0.0917) 
1.1983 
(0.2387) 
"standard errors of the elasticities are reported in parentheses. 
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elasticity of chicken from the mixed LES which is higher, the LES mixed 
elasticities are comparable to those of the mixed differential model. 
Looking at the retrieved elasticities, we see that once again the income 
elasticity of chicken is higher than before while the own price 
elasticities are comparable to those retrieved from the mixed differential 
system. 
First stage of budget allocation 
The mixed and direct elasticities reported and discussed are 
'conditional' elasticities, i.e., conditional on the first stage of budget 
allocation where expenditure shares among various groups of commodities 
(like the meat group) are optimally determined. For the typical case of 
the individual consumer who makes optimal quantity decisions given prices, 
when the utility function is weakly separable between the groups of 
commodities (and if the Engel curves within each sub-group utility are 
linear) the first stage budgeting is possible using group quantity and 
price indices and total expenditure on all groups.When sub—group 
utility maximization involves choosing optimal quantities (prices) within 
groups, the resulting first stage would be a direct (inverse) demand system 
for the first stage involving group price (quantity) indices and total 
expenditure. If optimal quantity decisions are made for some groups, and 
optimal price decisions for the others, the first stage would in fact be a 
'mixed' demand system involving both quantity and price indices as 
^^ The Rotterdam model can be used to approximate the first stage of 
budget allocation where optimal group expenditures are functions of total 
expenditures and two sets of price indices for each group, assuming only weak 
separability (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). 
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exogenous variables. 
In the present case of the mixed meat demand system, the first stage 
of budget allocation to the meats group Is given by 
% ~ f(PB'PP'*C'^ OF'^ G'^ ) (10) 
This formulation Implies that the utility function Is assumed to be weakly 
separable In the meats (M) group and homothetlcally weakly separable in the 
groups 'other food' (OF) and 'all other goods' (G). Hence price Indices 
are used for these groups (Pqf n^d Pq) while actual prices for beef and 
pork (pg and pp) and actual consumption quantities of chicken (xq) are 
used. Y now stands for total disposable income. Yjj the expenditure on 
meats is homogeneous of degree one in prices and total Income Y. 
The price index for 'other food' is calculated as follows. Let the 
'food' group consist of beef (B), pork (P), chicken (C) and 'other food' 
(OF). The Laspeyres price index for food is then given by 
PFt - (Si PitXio) / (Zi PioXio) i-B,P,C,OF 
The subscript 't' Indexes time, and 'o' the base period. The denominator 
Si Pio*lo Che food expenditure in the base period. Multiplying and 
dividing the numerator by PiQ, we have 
Ppt " ^1 (Pit/Pio) ^ io 1-B,P,C,0F 
where Si^  is the budget share of the i^  ^commodity in total food 
expenditure in the base period. Using quarterly data on total food 
expenditure and the consumer price index for food, the price index for 
'other food' is generated as 
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PqF " (POFt/POFo) " (Ppt ~ 2i(Pit/Pio)Sio) /^ OFo i-B,P,C 
The price index for 'all other goods' (G) is similarly generated using data 
on personal disposable income, total expenditure on food, price index for 
food and the consumer price index, CPI, 
~ (PGt/PGo) ~ (CPI - (PFt/PFo)SFo) /^ Go 
where and SQQ are budget shares of the food and non-food groups in 
total disposable income in the base period. 
The double log form of equation (10) was estimated with the 
homogeneity condition imposed and a trend coefficient included. The 
estimated equation showed a fairly good fit with an of 0.952. The 
elasticities of meat expenditure with respect to prices of 'other food' and 
'all other goods' were 0.7599 and -0.5189 implying that the meat group and 
'other food' are substitutes while the non-food and meat groups are 
complements. The elasticities of meat expenditure with respect to prices 
of beef, pork, quantity of chicken^ ® and total disposable Income were 
respectively 0.4839, 0.1973 , 0.0257 and 0.0777. Using these, the 
unconditional mixed elasticities were computed for beef, pork and chicken 
and are presented below in Table 8. 
^^ Although the partial derivative of the mixed cost function with 
respect to the quantity of chicken can be expected to be negative (from 6b) 
there is no reason for the elasticity of with respect to Xg to be 
negative. Differentiating the expression - PbXb(pb,Pp,Xq,Pof,Pg,Y) + 
PpXp(.) + x^ PcC ), w® see that this elasticity can be of either sign. 
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Table 8. Unconditional mixed elasticities 
Pg Pp Xg Expenditure 
Xg -0.3656 -0.0129 0.0242 0.0859 
Xp 0.1532 -0.4374 0.1498 0.0693 
Pc 0.2180 0.0499 -1.1873 0.0705 
These are unconditional mixed elasticities and cannot be compared to the 
unconditional direct elasticities from other studies. 
Summary and Conclusions 
A useful empirical framework is developed in this paper to study the 
case of mixed demands, where, at the market level, quantities (demanded) of 
some commodities are optimally determined given their prices while for the 
other commodities, the prices are optimally determined given their 
quantities. 
A 'mixed' cost function is derived using the concept of 'virtual' 
prices. Adding-up and homogeneity conditions are derived in elasticity 
terms. The equivalent of the Slutsky equation in terms of elasticities is 
also derived for the mixed demands. These relations are used to specify a 
^^ Direct unconditional elasticities cannot be retrieved from this 
matrix since it is only a part of the full matrix of unconditional mixed 
elasticities. 
76 
Rotterdam-type differential model for mixed demands. 
The empirical context is provided by the Canadian market for meats 
where the chicken market is subjected to 'supply management', while there 
is free trade in beef and pork with the U.S. Quarterly Canadian data for 
beef, pork and chicken are used to estimate the model. The estimated mixed 
elasticities are compared to the elasticities of the mixed LES model that 
is also estimated. Direct compensated elasticities are retrieved from the 
estimated mixed compensated elasticities which are compared to direct 
Rotterdam model that is also estimated. Finally, the first stage of budget 
allocation to the meats group is estimated, and the unconditional mixed 
demands are computed. 
The direct elasticities from the direct system are close to estimates 
from other studies of the Canadian meat demand and to those from the mixed 
system except for the own price elasticity of chicken which is higher in 
the mixed demand system indicating that demand for chicken is elastic in 
the Canadian market for meats. 
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SECTION III. FLEXIBLE FUNCTIONAL FORMS AND WEAK SEPARABILITY: 
A MONTE CARLO STUDY 
Introduction 
Separability of some groups of commodities from others in a utility 
(or production) function is a commonly maintained hypothesis in a lot of 
empirical work. This is because the concept of separability allows a 
significant advantage in modeling what might otherwise be an intractable 
problem. For example, weak separability of the utility function is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) for the 
existence of conditional demand functions such as the meat demands of 
Section II. In addition, homothetlc weak separability allows 
decentralization of the budget allocation so that the first stage of 
expenditure allocation to various groups can be carried out using 
consistent group price and quantity indices. Moreover, empirical and 
theoretical demand studies abstract from some allocation problems like 
labor-leisure or Intertemporal allocation decisions. These abstractions 
can also be rationalized by appropriate separability restrictions. 
Separability also has implications for the functional structure of 
dual representations of preferences. Thus homothetlc weak separability 
also implies indirect homothetlc weak separability. Another Interesting 
result is that simultaneous direct and indirect strong separability 
(addltivlty) of the utility function implies unitary income elasticities 
81 
(Houthakker 1960, Samuelson 1965).^  
Typically, separability is maintained in most empirical work. It is, 
however, a strong maintained hypothesis and should ideally be tested. 
Since Flexible Functional Forms (FFFs) have widely replaced the use of 
rigid functions in empirical analysis, it is of interest to test 
separability using FFFs. However, as Blackorby, Primont, and Russel (BPR 
1978) have shown, most of the commonly used FFFs are 'separability-
inflexible', i.e., the FFFs lose their flexibility when (global) 
separability is imposed on them. The alternative to imposing separability 
globally is to impose it locally at a point (Denny and Fuss 1977, Jorgensen 
and Lau 1975).^  Testing separability however remains a problem, first, 
because of the functional specification and second, because of the testing 
procedures used. 
Recently, Moschini (1990) proposed a Flexible Model that is globally 
separable but is not nested in the general, non-separable model. This 
section of the dissertation presents a Monte Carlo study of the abilities 
of the above globally separable model and the locally separable model in 
providing correct inferences about separability. The data used is 
generated through the (globally) separable W-S branch utility function used 
T^here is one exception to this result. Hicks (1969) shows that the 
general form of the exception is when the utility function takes the form 
U-u(x^ )+02...+a^ lnx^ , where u is any well behaved utility function of 
the single quantity xj^ . For this form alone, direct and indirect 
additivlty does not Imply unitary income elasticities. 
W^oodland (1979) avoided the inflexibility problem for the special 
case of constant returns to scale and one separable input on the production 
side. More recently, Pope and Hallam (1988) proposed rank tests of 
separability that can be implemented using standard nested hypothesis 
testing procedures. 
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by Bamett and Choi (1989). Tests of local separability are conducted 
using the Likelihood ratio test while the non-nested hypothesis tests 
proposed by Davidson and Mackinnon (1982) are used to test for global 
separability. 
This section is organized as follows. First, the concept of 
separability is briefly reviewed. The problem of 'separability-
inflexibility' is discussed and models under consideration are then 
presented. This is followed by a description of the data generating 
process. The testing procedures are explained followed by a discussion of 
the results. The concluding sub-section contains a summary and 
conclusions. 
Separability 
Separability can be characterized in terms of preference ordering 
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). 'Conditional ordering' on a sub-group 
(vector) of commodities Xy^  is defined as the ordering on x^  given arbitrary 
fixed quantities of commodities outside the group. When the conditional 
ordering on the goods in the group is independent of consumption levels 
outside the group, the group is said to be separable and can be represented 
by a sub-utility function. When the whole commodity vector (x) can be 
partitioned into G such groups, we have direct weak separability which 
takes the form (Goldman and Uzawa 1964): 
U - f(UA(x^ ),UB(xg),...UC(XG)) 
where xp^ , Xg,...Xg are subvectors and f is some function which is 
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increasing in all its arguments. It is obvious that weak separability has 
implications for commodity groupings, a notion that is particularly 
important in empirical analysis. A separable utility function of this form 
satisfies the original Leontief-Sono separability condition: 
a(U£(x)/Uj (x))/3xjj - 0 for all i.jeA and keB (la) 
where A and B are any two sub-groups. An alternative, differential 
formulation of the above condition is : 
(Uik(x)/Ui(x)) - (Ujk(x)/Uj(x)) (lb) 
where is the partial derivative of U with respect to the i^  ^variable 
and Ujjç is the cross partial derivative. 
An immediate implication of direct weak separability is the existence 
of conditional demands where the demand for any good depends on prices 
within the group and the total group expenditure, i.e., XiCp^ 'XA^  where 
ieA. Thus the decision making process of the consumer can be broken into 
sequential steps for analytic purposes. In the first stage, expenditure 
allocation is made between groups, while in the second stage, allocation is 
made between commodities in a group (Strotz 1957, Gorman 1959).^  
Separability also has consequences on the degree of (Hicksian) 
substitutability between goods in different groups. Consider the change in 
the consumption of Xj, ieA, due to a change in pj, jeB, holding utility 
A^n alternate rationale for commodity aggregation is that provided by 
the composite commodity theorem by which a group of commodities can be 
treated as a single good if the corresponding prices move proportionately. 
However, by definition, the usefulness of this theorem is limited for most 
empirical applications. 
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constant. This effect can be only through the group expenditure, 
®ij ~ (3%i/3yA)(^ yA/^ Pj)lu-const 
It can be shown that (Goldman and Uzawa 1964) 
Sji - sij - MAB (axi/ay)(axj/ay) 
where is a constant that is independent of the i and j. The above 
expression which summarizes the interrelation between the two groups is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition for weak separability.^  
Separability has also been defined on the dual representations of 
preferences. For example, implicit or quasi-separability is weak 
separability defined on the cost function. This is identical to 
separability defined on the distance function. A stronger definition of 
separability is that of strong separability where the sub-utility functions 
are additively separable from each other. While this condition is 
sufficient for all the implications for aggregation (over commodities) and 
two-stage budgeting that follow from weak separability, it is not 
necessary. The differential implications of strong separability are that 
conditions (1) hold for ieA, jeB and k€A,B. In terms of the restriction 
(2) on elasticities, strong separability implies that the constant is 
Independent of the groups to which 1 and j belong and is thus equal to some 
constant n for any pair of groups. 
B^PR (1978) give more general definitions of separability, including 
that of asymmetric separability which do not require differentiability. 
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Separability and Flexible Functional Forms 
A FFF can be interpreted in two ways. It can be viewed as a local 
approximation at a point as afforded by any of the FFFs, or it can be 
interpreted as an exact representation of the true function. If the former 
view is taken, separability can be imposed (and tested) locally at the 
point of approximation. The idea is that the approximation to a separable 
function need not itself be separable although it will satisfy the 
differential implication of separability at the point of approximation. If 
the latter interpretation is taken, the FFF must be globally separable. As 
BPR (1978) show, this narrows down the possible functional structures that 
the macro and the aggregator functions simultaneously take. For instance, 
if the macro function is a Translog in the aggregators, the aggregators are 
themselves Cobb-Douglas. The aggregators themselves can be Translog if and 
only if the macro function Is a Cobb-Douglas in the aggregators.^  
Clearly, BPR require that the separable model be parametrically nested in 
the unrestricted model. 
Moschini (1990) suggests that such a requirement may not be necessary 
and proposes that both the macro and the aggregator functions be modeled to 
the same degree of approximation such that the FFF criteria is satisfied.& 
To this end, a macro function that is a Translog in the aggregators is 
B^PR (1978 p.301) show that the generalized quadratic is separability-
inflexible from which the inflexibility of other commonly used FFF's 
follows. 
A^long a similar vein of thought Blackorby, Schworm and Fisher (1986) 
present a procedure (using a generalized symmetric Barnett function) for 
generating functional forms that remain flexible when separability is 
imposed. 
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proposed, where the aggregators are themselves Translogs. 
This analysis looks at homothetic separability for the case of three 
goods. In general, separability of the utility function does not imply nor 
is implied by the separability of the indirect utility function except in 
the case of homothetic separability (BPR 1978 p.89). Hence homothetic 
separability of the utility function is equivalent to the homothetic 
separability of the indirect utility function in the corresponding 
variables. In terms of the indirect utility function, the structure of 
preferences to be tested is 
V(VA(*1,*2)'*3) 
where is the aggregator that is homogeneous in its arguments. 
The Translog specification for the three good indirect utility 
function is given by 
InV - OQ + In*! + (1/2) Sj Inn^  Inwj (3) 
for all i,j - 1,2,3. The are the normalized prices p^ /y where y is 
the total expenditure. Roy's identity yields the following Marshallian 
demand functions in share form. 
0£ + a^ j Inwj 
wj^  - i - 1,2,3. (4a) 
a£ + Sj Qij^ j InJTj 
Since the share equations are homogeneous of degree zero in all the 
parameters the normalization - 1 is adopted. The homogeneity 
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restrictions - 0 are imposed in addition to the following 
separability restriction equivalent to (1) for the translog specification 
(3): 
**1 ®23 ~ ®2 ®13 (4b) 
Since separability Imposed on a utility function that is homogeneous 
implies homothetic separability (Denny and Fuss 1977), the resulting demand 
functions represent a homothetlcally separable utility function. Symmetry 
is maintained. The symmetry and homogeneity restrictions imply that the 
denominator of (4a) simplifies to unity. The total number of parameters in 
this system Is now four. 
The globally separable model (Moschlnl 1990) is given by 
InV* - OQ + InVy^ * + 03 Inxg + 4 033 (lnn3)2 
+ (1/2) ap^  (lnVy^ *)2 + 03^  ln*3 InV^ * 
InVA* ~ 1^ Pi. + (1/2) Sj Inn^  IniTj 
where - 0 because of the homogeneity of the aggregator Vp* in 
the jTj^ 's. The normalization - 1 is made . Since the parameter is 
not estimable from the data, we set - 0 which means that is defined 
up to a multiplicative factor. The usual symmetry conditions 03^  - 0^ 3 and 
1^2 " ^21 apply. The Marshalllan demands from this model are 
w^  - (a^  + InV^ * + 013^  lnn3)(^ i + Inn^  + P12 1^ *2) / D 
(5a) 
W2 - («A + ap^  InVy^ * + 03^  ^lnjr3)(^ 2 + P\2 + P22 1^ x2) / D 
(5b)  
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W3 - (03 + 03^  InV^ * + 0133 10^ 3) / D (5c) 
where D - + 03 + («^ ^^ +0:3^ )^InVy^ * + (03^ +033)1^ 3^. The adding-up 
restriction for this system of equations is given by + 03 - 1. As in 
the case of the locally separable model, homogeneity is imposed on the 
macro function so that ~ ®33 and - -0:3^  ^and once again the 
denominator reduces to unity. The number of parameters to be estimated in 
this model is also equal to four. 
Neither of the models (4) and (5) is nested in the other. Each of the 
models constitutes a specification for the null hypothesis of separability 
and can be tested against the alternative hypothesis that the utility 
function has the general form U(ni,n2,n3) whose Translog approximation is 
given by (3). The locally separable model is nested in (3) while the 
globally separable model is not. It is now interesting to see which 
specification of separability provides a stronger inference about 
separability. 
Data Generation 
We use Barnett's (1977) homothetic W-S branch utility tree as the 
underlying model that generates the Monte Carlo data (as in Barnett and 
Choi 1989). In this model both the macro and the aggregator functions are 
generalized quadratic mean of order p which is of the following form 
u(qi q„) - a ( si sj b^j q^f qjp)v2p 
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where p < H; > 0 for all i,J; Sj B^ j - 1; B^ j - Bjj^  for all 1 M j ; 
and A > 0. These conditions ensure the monotonicity and quasi-concavlty of 
the function. 
The generalized quadratic mean of order p form of the direct utility 
function is 
U - A (BiiqZP + ZBigqf X3/' + B22 X32P)V2p 
where 
q - (All *1^  ^+ 2Ai2 *2^  + A22 *2^ *)^ ^^  ^
Without loss of generality, the parameter A can be set equal to one. The 
elasticity of substitution takes the form, 
a(q,X3) - 1/(1 - p + R) 
where R — — p (^ 11^ 22"^ 12^ )/(^ llQ"^ "*"^ 12) (^ 12^ 2^2^ )^ snd Q — xg/q. The 
elasticity of substitution formula is homogeneous of degree zero in the 
quantities and can also be applied to the aggregator. The generalized 
quadratic mean of order p is by construction homogeneous in its arguments. 
Hence as in the case of the models to be estimated, the above model is more 
restrictive than homothetic separability since the macro function is also 
forced to be homothetic. 
Given that there are not more than two groups and two commodities in 
each of the two groups, the W-S branch utility model is a flexible 
functional form and thus can achieve arbitrary elasticities at any 
particular data point (Caves and Christensen 1980, Barnett and Lee 1985), 
i.e. for any arbitrary set of elasticities, given a data point we can 
always solve for the parameters of the flexible functional form. 
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Following Barnett and Choi (1989) we solve for the parameters at the 
data point (x)-20, (p)-l (and hence y, the total expenditure is 60) for a 
certain subset of elasticities. Because of homothetic separability there 
are only two independent elasticities, <7^ 2 <^ 13> where - *23- The 
values of these elasticities are varied for the different experiments. The 
parameters are solved for, using the three inverse demands derived from the 
above model with the restrictions given below. The inverse demands are, 
Pl/y - (Biiq2f-2(+Bi2X3fqf-2) (AiiXi2«-1+Aj^ 2Xi^ "^ X2^ ) / D (6a) 
P2/y - (Biiq2f-2&+Bi2X3 / D (6b) 
P3/y - (Bi2qfx3f-1 + 822X32^ -!) / D (6c) 
where the denominator D - (B2^ 2l^ *3^ +B22'^ 3^ ''^  + (8119^ +^812*3^ 9^ ) • The 
restrictions on the parameters are 
Ai2 - 0.1 (7) 
®12 ~ (8) 
1^1+^ 12+^ 22 - 1 (9) 
B11+B22+B22 " ^ (10) 
(2A2^ ]_2_I , 0. OS) 
. S (11) 
C]_2 (O.SAj^ j^ —A]^ 2^ 2+O.09) 
1 (2Bii2-l.6Bii-0.08) 
- 1 - . p (12) 
(^ 23 (0. SBj^ j^ —B2_]_2+O , 09) 
(7) and (8) are restrictions assumed in addition to the regularity 
conditions (9) and (10) on the parameters. (11) and (12) are the 
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elasticity restrictions where the pre-selected values of the elasticities 
appear on the left-hand-side. 
There are, In all, eight independent equations (only two of the three 
demand functions are Independent because of the addlng-up condition) in 
eight unknowns. In solving for the parameters at the stated data point, 
the following strategy is adopted. Dividing equation (6a) by (6b) and 
using (7) and (9), we solve for and ^ 22' Ffo™ equation (11) we get 
6 J Now can be obtained from either of the two Inverse demands (6a,b 
or B22 from 6c) and p from (12). 
The first 60 observations on the quantities and expenditure for the 
three commodity groups, perishables, semi-durables and services from 
Barnett (1981) are used. This data is normalized to yield the data point 
used above at the median. Using the parameter values, prices are then 
generated. Finally, noise is added to the quantity data without altering 
the total expenditure as in Barnett and Choi (1989). This is done as 
follows. Two vectors and Z2 are drawn from the normal distribution with 
variance 0.25. The new quantity series (say Xj^ , X2 and X3) were generated 
as follows. 
Xj_ — x^  + 
X2 - X2 - (s2PiXi)/P2 + Z2 
X3 - (y-p]^ X]^ -p2X2)/P3 
W^hen a 12 - 1, 6-0, the limiting form of q as 6 -+ 0 is used. This 
is given by Inq - (A11+A12)Inx^  + (A12+A22)Inxg. However, when - 1, the 
condition p - 0 Is Imposed on the Inverse demands. The resulting inverse 
demands are Identical to those derived from the limiting form of the macro 
function as p -• 0 . 
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where S2 - P2X2/(P2X2^ P3*3)'^  The various models are then estimated and 
the separability tests conducted. This step is repeated 100 times. Hence 
there are 100 data sets for every set of elasticities chosen. The random 
number generator is initialized with the same number for all the 
experiments so that the noise added across the experiments is the same. 
Tests of Separability 
For the chosen combinations of elasticities, two sets of experiments 
are performed. In the first, the locally separable models are tested 
against the unrestricted (non-separable) homothetic translog using the 
asymptotic log-likelihood ratio test statistic 
LR - 2 log - 2 log Lq 
which has a distribution under the null with one (the number of 
restrictions) degree of freedom. and Lq are the likelihood function 
values of the model under the alternate and null hypotheses respectively. 
In the second set, the globally separable models are tested against the 
unrestricted homothetic translog functions using non-nested tests. 
An econometric model, Hg is said to be nested within an alternative 
model if can be reduced to Hq by imposing one or more restrictions on 
®Noise added to quantities in this way implies nonzero covariance of 
error terms in the share dependent equations. Specifically, if e^  and 62 
are the error terms in the share equations of goods 1 and 2, the var(ej^ ) -
0.25(2%*%%). var(e2) - 0.25 + 8%%*%%), and cov(ej^ ,e2) - -
0.25(S%S2tT2t) where t indexes the observations. Alternatively, noise 
could have been added directly to the shares as was done for the simulation 
experiment in Section I, with chosen elements of the variance-covariance 
matrix. 
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its parameters. 'Nested' hypothesis testing, based on the likelihood ratio 
principle (such as testing for local separability in the present case) are 
common in econometric practice. These tests, however, do not recognize the 
possibility that the model being tested is only one of several models to 
explain the same data. For example, one may specify an alternative 
formulation of HQ (such as the globally separable model) that is not nested 
within and which does not nest within itself. In this case HQ and 
are said to be non-nested. 
The earliest procedure to test non-nested hypothesis is the Cox test 
based on the 'modified' likelihood ratio principle. As MacKinnon (1983) 
points out, the basic idea of this procedure is that the validity of a null 
hypothesis HQ as a representation of the data generation process can be 
tested by comparing the observed ratio of the values of the likelihood for 
HQ and for some non-nested alternative with an estimate of this 
likelihood ratio if Hq were true. If fits either better or worse than 
it should if HQ were true, HQ must be false. The Cox test and 
modifications of it to test nonlinear and multivariate cases (Pesaran and 
Deaton 1978) are however not easily implementable. Other tests based on 
the likelihood ratio principle have been proposed. For example, Vuong 
(1989) proposes likelihood ratio based statistic for testing the null 
hypothesis that competing models are equally close to the true data 
generating process against the alternative hypothesis that one model is 
closer. This is a more general approach that applies whether or not the 
models are nested. More recently Woolridge (1990) proposed a test for non­
nested models that is particularly convenient to apply. This test is based 
on the correlation between the residuals under the null and the gradient of 
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the alternative regression function. 
The non-nested tests used in this study are the P-tests based on 
artificial regressions. Proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981, 1982), 
these tests can be used to test multivariate non-linear models (such as the 
system of equations of the present case). Let the null hypothesis and the 
alternate against which it is tested be 
where i(-l,...m) is the index of equation and t(-l,...n) is the index of 
observation. For given t, the e^ j. (0,1) are assumed to be multivariate 
normal with covariance matrix Oq or and serially independent. 
The first step in the construction of a P test is to nest HQ and in 
an artificial compound model. Two possibilities which lead to two variants 
of the P tests are considered. The PQ test is given by the t-test of a - 0 
in the following regression 
where y, f,g and e denote vectors of length mn formed by stacking the 
y^ t's, fit's, git'® and «it'® respectively, F is an mn x k matrix formed 
by stacking the derivatives of fit with respect to evaluated at /9. 
and 7 are the Maximum Likelihood estimates of ^  and 7 respectively, and f 
and g denote f(/9) and g(7) . b is a k—vector of coefficients and a is a 
single coefficient to be estimated. Under HQ, the vector e is distributed 
as N(0,no®In). 
The P^  test utilizes the testing regression 
"O : yit - fit(Xt.f) + eit° 
"1 : Yit - git(Zt'7) + eifl (14) 
(13) 
y - f - Fb + a(g - f) + e 
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y - f - Fb + ACno^ i ®In) (g - f) + < 
where the notation Is as defined above. The t-test of A - 0 Is the test 
which is asymptotically equal to a Cox test. Intuitively, we can see that 
what the P test examines is that if Hq is a true model, its residuals 
should be uncorrelated with the difference between the fitted values from 
HQ and H^, which is what is exactly what the Cox test also examines. 
Results 
The estimation was carried out using the non-linear regression 
procedure available on SHÂZAM 6.1. The experiments were conducted for 36 
combinations of the true elasticities and as each of them were 
fixed at 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 3. For each set of the true 
elasticities, estimation and tests of separability were carried out 100 
times. 
In the tests of both local and global separability, the alternate 
hypothesis was always the non-separable homothetic translog. The null 
hypotheses were the models with true (T) separability V(V^ (ff2^ ,W2).ts), the 
false separability (F) V(V^ (irj^  ,*3), jr2), and the false separability (K) 
V(V^ (jr21'l's) I'fl) imposed. When the null is T, the number of times the null 
is rejected gives us the size of the test, and when the null is F or K, the 
power of the test. 
Results of the (nested) tests of local separability are organized in 
three tables. Table 1 contains the results of cases when ~ <^ 13» Table 
2 reports the results when either 'low', i.e. 0.1 or 0.3 and 
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Table 3 contains all other cases. Similarly, Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the 
results of the (non-nested) tests of global separability. In all the 
cases, the rejection (of the null) percentages are reported for 1, 5 and 10 
percent significance levels. 
Looking at Table 1, for the cases 4, 5 and 6 (when the true 
elasticities are 1, 1.5 and 3), the size (column T) and power (columns F 
and K) are low and similar. This is to be expected since given homothetic 
separability, if ai2 ~ ^ 13, all the three hypotheses must be true. These 
results are consistent with those of Barnett and Choi (1989). As in their 
study, for low levels of <722 *13, this pattern of size and power does 
not emerge (cases 1, 2 and 3 of Table 1 when the true elasticities are 0.1, 
0.3 and 0.5). In fact, we see that for these cases, the power when F is 
the null is low, while the power when K is the null is high. This same 
pattern is evident in Table 2. when one of the elasticities is 0.1 and the 
other is 0.3 (cases 1 and 6). In general unexpected results surface again 
in Table 2. We see that when either e7j^ 2 <^ 13 is 'low' even when the 
other is high, the power (F and K) is high but so is the size (the 
exception is when the other elasticity is equal to one; however, in case 12 
of Table 2, the power is also fairly low). Cases 2 and 7 suggest that the 
elasticity level 0.5 may be a cut off point between the 'high' and 'low' 
elasticities. 
One possible explanation of these results when either aj^ 2 <^ 13 is 
low the estimated models lie outside the globally well-behaved regions of 
the Translog (Christensen and Caves 1980). Indeed, from Table 7 of Barnett 
and Choi (1989), we see that the regularity violation percentage is 54.8 
when 1712 "0.1 and aj^ 3 - 0.3. When ai2 increases to one, this percentage 
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Table 1. Tests of local Separability: Rejection rates of the 
true and false hypotheses when the elasticities are 
similar 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
CT12 '13 K K 
1 0, ,1 0.1 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 11 100 
2 0. ,3 0.3 100 4 100 100 17 100 100 26 100 
3 0, ,5 0.5 32 0 60 60 2 78 69 7 84 
4 1, ,0 1 .0 4 2 5 11 4 15 15 5 23 
5 1, ,5 1, .5 3 1 5 12 4 13 20 5 21 
6 3, ,0 3, ,0 7 0 20 18 2 35 28 9 43 
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Table 2. Tests of local Separability: Rejection rates of the 
true and false hypotheses when one of the elasticities 
is low 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
(^ 12 "13 T F K T F K T F K 
1 0 .1 0.3 100 0 100 100 3 100 100 7 100 
2 0 .1 0.5 100 100 12 100 100 31 100 100 40 
3 0 .1 1.0 3 100 100 9 100 100 19 100 100 
4 0 .1 1.5 74 100 100 91 100 100 95 100 100 
5 0 .1 3.0 26 100 100 69 100 100 87 100 100 
6 0. 3 0.1 100 0 2 100 0 94 100 0 100 
7 0. 3 0.5 88 100 28 98 100 46 98 100 54 
8 0, .3 1.0 1 100 100 2 100 100 4 100 100 
9 0, ,3 1.5 9 100 100 24 100 100 38 100 100 
10 0, ,3 3.0 59 100 100 85 100 100 93 100 100 
11 0, ,5 0.1 100 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
12 1. 0 0.1 0 19 19 3 19 19 5 19 19 
13 1. 5 0.1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
14 3. 0 0.1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
15 0. 5 0.3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
16 1. 0 0.3 1 100 100 7 100 100 16 100 100 
17 1. 5 0.3 23 100 100 42 100 100 54 100 100 
18 3. 0 0.3 87 100 100 97 100 100 98 100 100 
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Table 3. Tests of local Separability: Rejection rates of the 
true and false hypotheses when both the elasticities 
are high 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
cri2 <^ 13 T F K T F K T F K 
1 0.5 1.0 2 100 100 4 100 100 9 100 100 
2 0.5 1.5 1 100 100 10 100 100 16 100 100 
3 0.5 3.0 14 100 100 26 100 100 42 100 100 
4 1.0 0.5 3 100 100 11 100 100 20 100 100 
5 1.0 1.5 3 100 99 8 100 99 12 100 100 
6 1.0 3.0 1 100 100 5 100 100 8 100 100 
7 1.5 0.5 100 99 9 18 99 99 24 99 99 
8 1.5 1.0 4 91 100 12 97 100 17 99 100 
9 1.5 3.0 2 100 100 11 100 100 20 100 100 
10 3.0 0.5 16 100 100 22 100 100 34 100 100 
11 3.0 1.0 3 100 100 13 100 100 20 100 100 
12 3.0 1.5 6 100 100 15 100 100 24 100 100 
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drops to 25. When both ai2 and are high (1.5 and 3 respectively), the 
regularity violation is 16 percent. That the rejection rates are as 
expected when at least one of the true elasticities is one is not 
surprising since the Translog is globally well behaved when <7^ 2 - <713 - 1. 
Table 3 presents the rejection rates of the null when a]^ 2 and are 
'high' (0.5, 1, 1.5, 3). In all the cases and for all three significance 
levels, the power (F and K) is high. Rejection rates of the null when it 
is true are low except in cases 3, 7 and 10 where one of the elasticities 
is still a fairly low 0.5. 
The results of the nested tests of local separability are treated as a 
bench mark to which the non-nested tests of (global) separability are 
compared. Tables 4, 5 and 6 present results of both the PQ and tests 
for all three significance levels. Once again, when the true ^^ 13 
are equal and 'high' (here cases 3 to 6 of Table 4), the size and power (F 
and K) are similar and fairly low. However, when the elasticities are 0.1 
and 0.3, the results are different. In fact, in case 1, the results of the 
PQ test are drastically different from the results of the P^  test. 
In Tables 5a and 5b, when either ai2 *^ 13 0.1, results vary for 
the PQ and P^  tests (in fact, from Table 5a, we see that the powers F and K 
vary for the PQ test in cases 1-6 and 11). However, when either ai2 or a]^ 3 
is 0.3 and the other higher than or equal to 0.5, the power (F and K) is 
consistently high and the size relatively low for both the PQ and tests. 
The discrepancy between the PQ and the P]^  tests and between the rejection 
rates of the hypotheses F and K completely disappears for all ai2 and cig 
greater than or equal to 0.5, as can be seen in Tables 6a and 6b. In fact 
for all the cases in these tables the tests exhibit fairly good size and 
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Table 4. Tests of global Separability: Rejection rates of the 
true and false hypotheses when the elasticities are 
similar 
Results of the PQ test 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
*^ 12 (^ 13 T F K T F K T F K 
1 0.1 0.1 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 
2 0.3 0.3 0 98 45 1 98 53 7 98 70 
3 0.5 0.5 14 24 19 17 27 24 21 34 30 
4 1.0 1.0 8 1 8 10 3 12 14 5 22 
5 1.5 1.5 10 2 10 11 4 15 15 7 26 
6 3.0 3.0 10 6 14 15 7 21 24 17 33 
Results of the test 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
*12 "13 T F K T F K T F K 
1 0, ,1 0. ,1 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 
2 0, ,3 0, ,3 9 100 100 13 100 100 22 100 100 
3 0. ,5 0, 5 16 24 20 17 27 24 24 35 35 
4 1, .0 1, ,0 8 2 9 11 4 13 14 5 23 
5 1. 5 1, ,5 11 3 11 12 4 15 15 7 27 
6 3, ,0 3, ,0 11 7 17 16 11 23 24 17 35 
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Table 5a. Tests of global Separability: Rejection rates of the 
true and false hypotheses for the PQ test when one of 
the elasticities is low 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
ai2 <^ 13 T F K T F K T F K 
1 0.1 0.3 26 96 1 36 96 1 62 97 4 
2 0.1 0.5 37 100 1 55 100 1 79 100 1 
3 0.1 1.0 31 100 11 43 100 20 61 100 37 
4 0.1 1.5 20 100 58 28 100 68 56 100 88 
5 0.1 3.0 28 100 40 37 100 50 53 100 68 
6 0.3 0.1 0 100 54 0 100 70 4 100 95 
7 0.3 0.5 3 100 100 6 100 100 13 100 100 
8 0.3 1.0 4 100 100 6 100 100 12 100 100 
9 0.3 1.5 18 100 100 23 100 100 31 100 100 
10 0.3 3.0 16 100 100 18 100 100 29 100 100 
11 0.5 0.1 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 1 
12 1.0 0.1 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 
13 1.5 0.1 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 
14 3.0 0.1 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 
15 0.5 0.3 14 100 100 17 100 100 24 100 100 
16 1.0 0.3 5 100 100 10 100 100 19 100 100 
17 1.5 0.3 4 100 100 5 100 100 15 100 100 
18 3.0 0.3 7 100 100 8 100 100 13 100 100 
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Table 5b, Tests of global Separability: Rejection rates of the 
true and false hypotheses for the test when one of 
the elasticities is low 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
ai2 ^13 T F K T F K T F K 
1 0 . 1  0.3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 0.1 0.5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3 0.1 1.0 55 100 100 61 100 100 66 100 100 
4 0.1 1.5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5 0.1 3.0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6 0.3 0.1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7 0.3 0.5 2 100 100 3 100 100 6 100 100 
8 0.3 1.0 4 100 100 6 100 100 14 100 100 
9 0.3 1.5 23 100 100 26 100 100 31 100 100 
10 0.3 3.0 20 100 100 26 100 100 30 100 100 
11 0.5 0.1 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
12 1.0 0.1 36 100 100 39 100 100 42 100 100 
13 1.5 0.1 38 100 100 52 100 100 84 100 100 
14 3.0 0.1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
15 0.5 0.3 15 100 100 23 100 100 33 100 100 
16 1.0 0.3 8 100 100 12 100 100 21 100 100 
17 1.5 0.3 5 100 100 8 100 100 17 100 100 
18 3.0 0.3 7 100 100 11 100 100 14 100 100 
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Table 6a. Tests of global Separability: Rejection rates of the 
true and false hypotheses for the PQ when both the 
elasticities are high 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
*12 *13 T F K T F K T F K 
1 0 .5 1.0 3 100 100 4 100 100 8 100 100 
2 0 .5 1.5 2 100 100 4 100 100 11 100 100 
3 0 .5 3.0 5 100 100 8 100 100 16 100 100 
4 1, .0 0.5 6 100 100 11 100 100 20 100 100 
5 1, .0 1.5 5 100 99 7 100 99 11 100 100 
6 1, ,0 3.0 1 100 100 2 100 100 8 100 100 
7 1. ,5 0.5 6 100 100 10 100 100 20 100 100 
8 1. 5 1.0 11 95 100 11 97 100 16 99 100 
9 1. 5 3.0 5 100 100 8 100 100 14 100 100 
10 3. 0 0.5 9 100 100 11 100 100 16 100 100 
11 3. 0 1.0 9 100 100 11 100 100 20 100 100 
12 3. 0 1.5 12 100 100 14 100 100 21 100 100 
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Table 6b. Tests of global Separability: Rejection rates of the 
true and false hypotheses for the when both the 
elasticities are high 
True 1 % 5 % 10 % 
elasticities level level level 
*12 *13 T F K T F K T F K 
1 0.5 1 .0 3 100 100 4 100 100 8 100 100 
2 0.5 1, ,5 2 100 100 4 100 100 11 100 100 
3 0.5 3, ,0 8 100 100 10 100 100 18 100 100 
4 1 .0 0, ,5 6 100 100 11 100 100 20 100 100 
5 1, .0 1, ,5 5 100 99 7 100 99 12 100 100 
6 1, .0 3. ,0 2 100 100 2 100 100 8 100 100 
7 1 .5 0 .5 7 100 100 12 100 100 21 100 100 
8 1 .5 1 .0 11 95 100 11 97 100 16 99 100 
9 1, ,5 3, 0 6 100 100 8 100 100 15 100 100 
10 3, ,0 0, ,5 10 100 100 11 100 100 17 100 100 
11 3. 0 1, 0 9 100 100 11 100 100 20 100 100 
12 3. 0 1. 5 12 100 100 14 100 100 21 100 100 
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power. 
From the above discussion, tests of local separability seem to perform 
poorly when one of the true elasticities is equal to or lower than 0.5, 
while the tests of global separability seem to do well for elasticities 
greater than or equal to 0.5. This suggests that the regular region of the 
globally separable model may possibly be larger than that of the Translog. 
In general, however, the non-nested tests of global separability seem to 
perform as well as the tests for local separability, and In fact marginally 
better since they do well for the cases when one of the elasticities is 
'low' at 0.5. The PQ and Pj^  tests both seem to perform similarly except 
for the extreme cases when at least one of the true elasticities is low. 
Thus the globally separable model seems to do well in providing correct 
inferences about separability. This is in line with the results of 
Moschini (1990) who tests local and global models of two specifications of 
separability using the test proposed by Vuong (1989). 
Summary and Conclusions 
Weak separability of a group of commodities from the others in a 
utility (or production) function is a commonly maintained hypothesis in a 
lot of empirical work. Ideally, such an assumption should be tested before 
it is maintained. However, imposing separability parametrically on a FFF 
renders it inflexible by restricting the structural form of either the 
macro or the aggregator functions. This is the case when the restricted 
(separable) model is required to be parametrically nested in the 
unrestricted model. This study looks at a recently proposed globally 
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separable flexible functional form that models the macro and the aggregator 
functions to the same degree of flexibility. This is achieved by using the 
Translog to model the macro and the aggregator functions. 
The locally separable Translog is compared to the globally separable 
model using Monte Carlo techniques. Data is generated from a globally 
separable utility function and noise is added to the quantities. The 
locally and globally separable models are then estimated. When the locally 
and globally separable models are tested against the unrestricted Translog 
using the Likelihood ratio test and non-nested tests (the PQ and the 
tests) respectively, we find that the tests exhibit high power and low 
rejection rates of the true hypothesis for true elasticities that are not 
low in value. 
In conclusion, the globally separable model seems to do as well and in 
fact slightly better than the locally separable model in making the correct 
inference about separability. It is, however, of interest to see how 
these results change when other non-nested tests are employed. 
108 
References 
Barnett, W.A. "Recursive Subaggregation and a Generalized Hypocycloidal 
Demand Model." Econometrlca. 45(1977):1117-1136. 
Barnett, W.A. Consumer Demand and Labor Supply. Amsterdam, North-Holland, 
1981. 
Barnett, W.A. and S. Choi. "A Monte Carlo Study of Blockwise Weak 
Separability." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. 
7(1989):363-377. 
Blackorby, C., D. Primont and R.R. Russel. Duality. Separability, and 
Functional Structure : Theory and Economic Applications. Amsterdam, 
North-Holland, 1978. 
Blackorby, C., W. Schworm and T. Fisher. "Testing for the Existence of 
Input Aggregates in an Economy Production Function." Working Paper 
(1986), University of British Columbia, Department of Economics. 
Caves, D.W. and L.R. Christensen. "Global Properties of Flexible 
Functional Forms," The American Economic Review. 70(1980):422-432. 
Davidson, R. and J.G. MacKinnon. "Several Tests for Model Specification in 
the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses." Econometrica. 49(1981):781— 
793. 
Davidson, R. and J.G. MacKinnon. "Some Non-Nested Hypothesis Tests and the 
Relations Among them." Review of Economic Studies. XLIX(1982);551-
565. 
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer. Economics and Consumer Behavior. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1980. 
Denny, M. and M, Fuss. "The use of Approximation Analysis to Test for 
Separability and the Existence of Consistent Aggregates." The 
109 
American Economic Review. 67(1977):404-418. 
Goldman, S,M. and H, Uzawa. "A Note on Separability In Demand Analysis." 
Econometrlca. 332(1964): 387-398. 
Gorman, W.M. "Separable Utility and Aggregation." Econometrlca. 
27(1959):469-481. 
Hicks, J.R. "Direct and Indirect Addltivity." Econometrlca. 37(1969): 353-
354. 
Houthakker, H.S. "Additive Preferences," Econometrlca. 28(1960);244-257. 
Jorgensen, D.W. and L.J. Lau. "The Structure of Consumer Preferences." 
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement. 4(1975)49-102. 
MacKinnon, J.G. "Model Specification Tests Against Non-Nested 
Alternatives." Econometric Reviews 2(1983):85-110. 
Moschini, G. "A Non-nested Test of Separability for Flexible Functional 
Forms." Unpublished manuscript, Iowa State University, 1990. 
Pope, R.D. and A. Hallam. "Separability Testing in Production Economics." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 70(1988): 143-152. 
Samuelson, P.A. "Using Full Duality to show that Simultaneously Additive 
Direct and Indirect Utilities implies Unitary Price Elasticity of 
Demand." Econometrlca. 33(1965):781-796. 
Strotz, R.H. "The Empirical Implications of a Utility Tree." 
Econometrlca. 25(1957):269-280. 
Vuong, Q.H. "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested 
Hypotheses." Econometrlca 
Woodland, A.D. "On Testing Weak Separability." Journal of Econometrics. 
8(1978):383-398. 
Wooldrldge, J.M. "An Encompassing Approach to Conditional Mean Tests with 
110 
applications to testing Nonnested Hypotheses." Journal of 
Econometrics. 45(1990): 351-366. 
Ill 
GENERAL SUMMARY 
In this study, the empirical examination of consumer demand systems 
was investigated within the framework afforded by duality in consumer 
theory. The focus of attention has been on theoretically valid empirical 
specification of demand systems that reflect particular market situations 
or preference structures, A common tool of empirical analysis that runs 
through all three sections of this dissertation is that of a flexible 
functional form (FFF). Such functional forms which provide local second 
order approximations to unknown functions are widely used in applied 
econometrics today. Since these EPFs impose no prior restrictions on 
estimated demand elasticities, considerable attention has been devoted in 
recent years to the development of less restrictive and more well behaved 
FFFs that meet a wider criteria of acceptability. 
This study first examined the market situation where supplies are 
inelastic and prices must adjust to clear the market. Such market 
situations arise for most agricultural commodities, particularly for 
perishable commodities. A price dependent demand system can reflect such a 
market situation. Two flexible inverse demand systems were proposed. The 
first of these, a linear inverse demand system (LIDS) was derived using a 
functional form that is a symmetric dual to the PIGLOG cost function of the 
AIDS model. This new model does not embody the aggregation properties of 
the AIDS model. It does, however, present a particularly convenient linear 
system of equations that may carry a significant advantage over the 
available nonlinear flexible inverse demand systems, especially when the 
number of goods is large. A simulation exercise revealed that the LIDS 
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performs as well and in fact slightly better than the inverse Translog 
system. 
In specifying such market demands however, a problem that needs 
attention is that of aggregation. This issue, in demand analysis, is cast 
in terms of aggregating individual quantity dependent demands. Whether the 
market demands to be estimated are inverse or direct, the aggregation 
conditions need to hold. The aggregation problem was discussed and a new 
FFF was proposed that satisfies such aggregation conditions. For the class 
of quasi-homothetic preferences considered (at the individual level), the 
market demands satisfy integrability conditions without any additional 
restrictions. Such a market demand system can be derived from a 
specification of some hypothetical utility function such as the FFF 
proposed. This specification yields a system of share dependent nonlinear 
equations. 
The Canadian market for meat poses an interesting problem for economic 
analysis. While the country trades freely in beef and pork with the U.S., 
so that it is a price taker for these commodities, the Chicken market in 
Canada is subjected to supply restricting activities of domestic marketing 
boards. This in essence creates the situation of an inelastic supply of 
chicken where prices must adjust to clear the market while the converse is 
true for beef and pork. 
Such a market situation calls for a mixed demand system where the 
prices of some, and quantities of other commodities are exogenous. 
However, the existing theoretical framework for mixed demands does not 
allow a convenient transition to an empirical model. The concept of 
'virtual' or 'shadow' price was used in developing a theoretical framework 
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that does allow the specification of an empirical mixed demand system. 
The notion of 'virtual' price was used in developing a 'mixed' cost 
function. Using this, the Slutsky equations were derived, the elasticity 
forms of which were easily implemented in a differential approximation of 
the mixed demand system. Such a differential demand system also satisfies 
a meaningful and an alternate criterion of local approximation. 
This model was estimated using Canadian data. The elasticities from 
this system compared well with those from the mixed LES which was also 
estimated. However, the direct elasticities retrieved from the mixed 
system differed from those of the direct differential system with regard to 
the own price elasticity of chicken. The mixed system suggests that the 
demand for chicken in Canada may be more elastic than implied by estimated 
direct systems. An ad hoc specification of the first stage of budget 
allocation was also estimated and the unconditional elasticities computed. 
The notion of separability is frequently invoked in applied demand 
analysis. Indeed, it is only with such an assumption that we can specify a 
demand system for meats as was done for the Canadian situation. In 
general, separability is a strong maintained hypothesis and should ideally 
be tested before it is maintained. However, testing separability using 
FFFs has been problematic. While the alternative of imposing local 
separability of a FFF exists, imposing global separability parametrically 
on most of the commonly used FFFs renders them inflexible. 
In Section III, a recently proposed globally separable FFF is 
considered. Its ability, as well as that of the locally separable model, 
in providing correct inferences about separability are examined in a Monte 
Carlo study. Tests of local separability were carried out using the 
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likelihood ratio test while tests of global separability were conducted 
using non-nested P tests. Results revealed that both the locally and 
globally separable models fared well for certain regions of the true 
elasticity values. When the true elasticities were fairly 'high', i.e., 
around or greater than one, all three tests exhibited low size and high 
power. Rejection patterns however became unpredictable when elasticities 
were low. However, the globally separable model seemed to perform well for 
a few cases of 'low' elasticity values as well. 
A number of interesting questions were raised in this study. To begin 
with, one might wonder about the large sample behavior of the LIDS model. 
Further research on the aggregable inverse demand is also called for. Its 
ability in replicating the true data generation process can be examined in 
simulation studies. Using this functional form, the hypothesis of quasi-
homothetic preferences can be tested using non-nested hypothesis tests. 
The empirical mixed demand system presents a framework of analysis for the 
particular market situation it reflects. Thus, other issues, such as the 
debate on structural change in preferences for meat, can be examined in 
this framework. Finally, the performance of the globally flexible 
functional form can be examined using other non-nested tests. This would 
show if the results of the present study are specific to the tests used in 
this study. 
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